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The Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (CDSM 
Directive) introduced a change of paradigm with regard to the liability of 
some platforms in the European Union. Under the safe harbour rules of 
the Directive on electronic commerce (E-Commerce Directive), 
intermediaries in the EU were shielded from liability for acts of their users 
committed through their services, provided they had no knowledge of it. 
Although platform operators could be required to help enforce copyright 
infringements online by taking down infringing content, the E-commerce 
Directive also drew a very clear line that intermediaries could not be 
obliged to monitor all communications of their users and install general 
filtering mechanisms for this purpose. The Court of Justice of the 
European Union confirmed this in a series of cases, amongst other reasons 
because filtering would restrict the fundamental rights of platform 
operators and users of intermediary services. Twenty years later, the 
regime for online intermediaries in the EU has fundamentally shifted with 
the adoption of Article 17 CDSM Directive, the most controversial and 
hotly debated provision of this piece of legislation. For a specific class of 
online intermediaries called “online content-sharing providers” 
(OCSSPs), uploads of infringing works by their users now result in direct 
liability and they are required undertake “best efforts” to obtain 
authorization for such uploads. With this new responsibility come further 
obligations, which oblige OCSSPs to make best efforts to ensure that 
works for which they have not obtained authorization are not available on 
their services. How exactly OCSSPs can comply with this obligation is 
still unclear. However, it seems unavoidable that compliance will require 
them to install measures such as automated filtering (so-called “upload 
filters”) using algorithms to prevent users from uploading unlawful 
content. Given the scale of the obligation, there is a real danger that 
measures taken by OCSSPs in fulfilment of their obligation will amount 
to expressly prohibited general monitoring. What seems certain however 
is that the automated filtering, whether general or specific in nature, 
cannot distinguish appropriately between illegitimate and legitimate use 
of content (e.g. because it would be covered by a copyright limitation). 
Hence, there is a serious risk of over-blocking of certain uses that benefit 
from strong fundamental rights justifications such as the freedom of 
expression and information or freedom of artistic creativity. 
 
This article first outlines the relevant fundamental rights as guaranteed 
under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European 
Convention of Human Rights that are affected by an obligation to monitor 
and filter for copyright infringing content. Second, it examines the impact 
on fundamental rights of the obligations OCSSPs incur under Article 17, 
which are analysed and tested also with regard to their compatibility with 
general principles of EU law such as proportionality and legal certainty. 
These are, on the one hand, obligations to prevent the upload of works for 
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which they have not obtained authorization and, on the other, an 
obligation to remove infringing content upon notification and prevent the 
renewed upload in relation to these works and protected subject matter 
(so-called “stay down”- obligations). Third, the article assesses the 
mechanisms to safeguard the right of users of online content-sharing 
services under Article 17. The analysis demonstrates that the balance 
between the different fundamental rights in the normative framework of 
Article 17 CDSM Directive is a very difficult one to strike and that overly 
strict and broad enforcement mechanisms will most likely constitute an 
unjustified and disproportionate infringement of the fundamental rights 
of platform operators as well as of users of such platforms. Moreover, 
Article 17 is the result of hard-fought compromises during the elaboration 
of the Directive which led to the adoption of a long provision with 
complicated wording and full of internal contradictions. As a 
consequence, it does not determine with sufficient precision the balance 
between the multiple fundamental rights affected, nor does it provide for 
effective harmonization. These conclusions are of crucial importance for 
the development of the regulatory framework for the liability of platforms 
in the EU since the CJEU will have to rule on the compatibility of Article 
17 with fundamental rights in the near future, as a result of an action for 
annulment of introduced by the Polish government. In fact, if certain 
features of that article are to be considered incompatible with the 
constitutional framework of the EU, this should lead to the erasing of 
certain paragraphs and, possibly, even of the entire provision from the text 






The obligation of hosting platforms to partake in the enforcement of 
copyright infringement has been subject since 2000 to the legal 
framework of the E-Commerce Directive (ECD). This directive provides 
liability exemptions for certain types of intermediaries when users 
commit unlawful acts on their services, including copyright 
infringements. The evolution of online services, giving users vast 
possibilities to upload autonomously copyright-protected content, 
combined with the will to involve more strongly the platforms in the 
copyright enforcement process however recently induced the European 
Union (EU) legislator to revise the legal framework and to burden certain 
types of hosting services, called “online content-sharing service providers 
(OCSSPs)”, with more responsibilities. 
 
With the Directive on Copyright in a Digital Single Market (CDSM 
Directive), the EU creates in Art. 17(a) special liability regime for this 
specific category of online platforms. It makes OCSSPs directly liable for 
acts of their users when they upload content onto their services and 
thereby (potentially) infringe copyright. As a result, OCSSPs must 
themselves obtain authorization for such uploads - or provide “best 
efforts” to obtain authorization - and failure to do so triggers obligations 
to ensure that unlawful content is not being made available or removed 
upon request. According to Article 17(4) more specifically, OCSSPs are 
required to comply with a complicated combination of obligations that 
require them to undertake “best efforts” to (1) obtain authorization for 
content uploaded by their users, (2) to prevent the availability of 
unauthorized content, and (3) to remove unauthorized content and to 
ensure its future unavailability in order to avoid liability. 
 
However, the new legal framework does not only significantly affect 
OCSSPs in the way they organize their services but will also considerably 
impact the interests of users of such platforms as well as rightholders 
whose works and other subject matter are shared on such services. If the 
directive strongly affirms that the measures required under Article 17(4) 
should under no circumstances lead to general monitoring obligation for 
online content-sharing services (Art. 17(8)), reinforcing a fundamental 
principle of the established EU platform liability regime, it is very likely 
that OCSSPs will have no other option but to resort to automated 
enforcement (i.e., the algorithmic identification and filtering of 
potentially infringing content) in order to fulfil the obligation imposed on 
them. Filtering infringing content without checking the legality of every 
upload of all the works notified by rightholders leads potentially to an 
unsolvable contradiction. Moreover, automated enforcement by way of 
filtering and monitoring will inevitably affect lawful content uploaded by 
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users due to the technological limitations of monitoring and filtering 
technology, frustrating their ability to express themselves, to disseminate 
their creativity and to share and receive information. 
 
The impacts of the new liability system provided by the CDSM 
directive on the various interests and fundamental rights of users, 
rightholders and the platforms are significant and therefore necessitate a 
very careful assessment to ensure its compatibility with the EU treaties 
and thus with the fundamental principles at the core of the EU 
construction. In the past, the CJEU’s case-law on intermediary liability 
has shaped this complex triangular relationship in the light of fundamental 
rights. The introduction of additional obligations for specific types of 
intermediaries requires revisiting this relationship in an Article 17 
scenario. Therefore, this study re-examines the balance between the 
various fundamental rights and other interests in the light of the rights and 
obligations defined in Article 17 in general, and specifically the 
obligations for OCSSPs to filter certain types of content in Article 17(4). 
Such a re-examination seems essential as national legislators are currently 
(or soon will be) struggling with the implementation of the CDSM 
Directive in their national law. The new legislative framework for certain 
hosting platforms has also led to strong criticism among the academic 
community for its problematic implications and imbalances; the new 
liability system has then been challenged by Poland before the CJEU 
immediately after the adoption of the directive, requesting for the 
annulment of the disputed article in parts or in full.  
 
One of the main criticisms aims at the incompatibility of Article 17 
with European fundamental rights. These rights are guaranteed, for acts 
of the EU, by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(EUCFR) and the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). The rights contained in these 
instruments have been interpreted and further, especially in relation to the 
online environment, shaped by the jurisprudence of the CJEU and the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Accordingly, the provisions 
of the CDSM Directive have to be interpreted in the light of these two 
instruments and the jurisprudence of their respective courts. Their rich 
case-law provides guidance on the conflicts and challenges created by 
Article 17 CDSM Directive, including: 
The right to freedom of expression, including the right to receive and 
impart information, and the right to artistic freedom are significantly 
restricted if the obligations of Article 17 CDSM Directive can only be met 
by the use of automated filtering. Automated filtering leads to the 
inaccessibility of content shared on online content-sharing platforms, 
thereby frustrating the rights of users in a significant manner. 
Furthermore, users uploading content, which is caught by automated 
filtering mechanisms, would be restricted in their right to impart 
information, including such information that could be lawfully made 
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available under an exception or limitation to copyright. These legitimate 
uses such as e.g. for quotations, criticism, review or parody purposes 
benefit from a very strong fundamental rights justification which the 
directive otherwise explicitly aims to safeguard (Art 17 (7)). Thus, any 
automated filtering inevitably induced by Art. 17 that would be incapable 
of recognizing and respecting these legitimate uses would not be only 
violating the explicit will of the legislature but also important rights in a 
democratic society.      
Requiring OCSSPs to take a more active role in the enforcement of 
copyright requires them to invest significant financial and human 
resources in order to comply with their new obligations under Article 17 
CDSM. Burdening private businesses with such broad tasks, coupled with 
legal uncertainty resulting from the vagueness of the obligations imposed 
on OCSSPs, restricts their freedom to conduct business as protected by 
Art. 16 of the Charter, as the CJEU recalled on numerous occasions. In 
the context of Article 17, this relates, first, to the requirement to cooperate 
with rightholders and to conclude licensing agreements for content 
uploaded by their users, second to verify that this content does not fall 
under an exception and limitation in one of the 27 member states, which 
is extremely challenging as these are not harmonized, and finally to 
disable and prevent access to content for which no authorization has been 
obtained and is not covered by a limitation. All these new obligations are 
very heavy and complex to implement. Therefore, they must be 
considered in the light of the fundamental right of freedom to conduct 
business, as well as with regard to the principle of proportionality and 
legal certainty.  
Automated enforcement necessarily requires the processing of 
personal data and enforcing copyright infringements necessitates 
disclosing such information to injured parties or law enforcement 
authorities. The data of users, i.e. when and what they upload and 
download to and from online content-sharing platforms, is protected by 
the right to the protection of personal data and the respect for private and 
family life. In cases of alleged violations of copyright, these rights conflict 
with the right to property of rightholders. In this regard, the CJEU has 
already determined that the general filtering of user data to prevent 
infringements cannot be reconciled with the fundamental rights of users, 
but also those of platform operators.  
One of the main objectives advanced for Article 17 CDSM Directive 
is to provide rightholders with better control over the unauthorized 
exploitation of their works and other subject matter. In this regard, it must 
be considered that the right to property does not provide absolute 
protection and that the right needs also to serve a social function, which 
takes particular shape in the normative framework of copyright. The 
protection provided for rightholders by Article 17 CDSM Directive and 
its specific application must have regard to these underlying principles 
and must guide the definition of the obligations of OCSSPS to partake in 
the protection of copyright but also the restriction of the rights of users, 
specifically the rights to freedom of expression and artistic freedom.   
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The obligation to monitor ex post or ex ante content to be uploaded 
on the platform will inevitably lead to numerous conflicts between the 
interests of rightholders and users because of too restrictive filtering 
mechanism that disables lawful uses, or the failure to remove unlawful 
content. The settlement of these disputes implicates the right to an 
effective remedy, both for users and rightholders. Problematic in this 
regard is the forum in which these disputes are settled and in which the 
unlawfulness of uploaded content is determined. Because the interests at 
stake are grounded in fundamental rights, private dispute settlement 
managed only by platform operators or rightholders is likely not to be 
compliant with procedural fundamental rights and poses a delicate 
question of legitimacy with regard to who decide which content should 
be available on these platforms.  
 
In short, the obligation imposed on OCSSPs under Article 17(4) will 
make it unavoidable that platforms within the scope of the provision will 
monitor and filter content uploaded by their users by automated means. 
This is the result of legal drafting that fails to determine the balance 
between the relevant fundamental rights at EU level. It is constitutionally 
highly problematic that a prerogative and obligation of the EU legislator 
would have to be performed by national legislators, with outcomes that 
will most likely result in a lack of full harmonization in crucial areas of 
copyright law and, as a result, legal uncertainty in the EU. 
 
The automated enforcement that is almost certain to emerge will 
significantly restrict the fundamental rights of users of these platforms by 
preventing the availability of lawful uploads. To safeguard the rights of 
platform users, specifically their right to receive and impart information, 
it is absolutely necessary to control and limit the scope of automated 
enforcement as much as possible, to prevent for example only the upload 
of content that is manifestly illegal. What is manifestly illegal and what 
constitutes permissible automated enforcement mechanisms is however a 
difficult and complex assessment and should not be left for private actors 
to decide, as this qualification will affect the exercise of important 
fundamental rights that are of crucial importance for the guarantee of a 
democratic and pluralistic society. For this reason, it is suggested that an 
independent institution is set up at EU level to monitor the 
implementation and application of Art. 17 in a fundamental rights-
compliant manner. This institution could take the form of a supervisory 
body that would also perform alternative dispute resolution (ADR) 
functions, ensuring that disputes arising in relation to uploaded content 
are settled impartially and in an efficient, but fundamental rights-
compliant manner. In addition, this institution could be tasked with, inter 
alia, issuing guidelines for the interpretation of Article 17, developing 
best practices together with stakeholders, provide for empirical data to 
assess its impacts, and to recommend - if proven necessary - 
improvements to policy makers. Only under this condition could the 
liability system created by Art. 17 provide for sufficient guarantees for 
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fundamental rights and basic legal principles of EU law, securing that 
what is available online results not solely from automated technological 
means or the decisions of private economic players. In the absence of such 
an institution, it is hard to imagine how Article 17 could be “saved” from 







After a long political and public debate, the European legislator 
adopted the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (CDSM 
Directive)1 in April 2019.2 One of its core provisions redefines the 
liability regime for specific online platforms by creating new obligations 
for large content-hosting platforms, so-called online content-sharing 
service providers (OCSSPs).3 According to the Directive, this change of 
paradigm in the liability system is meant to reflect the changing realities 
of how works and other subject matter protected by copyright are 
accessed online.4 Because of their special position, OCSSPs are from now 
on considered to perform copyright relevant acts when their users upload 
content.5 In turn, Article 17 CDSM Directive establishes an extremely 
complicated system of conditions under which OCSSPs can avoid 
liability. 
Article 17 has come under heavy critique,6 notably for the effects it is 
likely to have on various fundamental rights (FR).7 The effects of the 
 
1 Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 
2019 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending 
Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC, OJ L 130, 17.5.2019, p. 92-125 (CDSM Directive). 
2 Providing a general overview of the Directive: João Pedro Quintais, The New 
Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive: A Critical Look, 42(1) European 
Intellectual Property Review (2020), 28-41 and Séverine Dusollier, The 2019 Directive 
on Copyright in the Digital Single Market: Some progress, a few bad choices, and an 
overall failed ambition, 57(4) Common Market Law Review (2020), 979-1030. 
3 These service providers are defined in Article 2(6) and Recital 62 CDSM Directive, see 
infra 3.1. 
4 Recital 61 CDSM Directive. 
5 Article 17(1) CDSM Directive. 
6 See for example Felipe Romero Moreno, ‘Upload filters’ and human rights: 
implementing Article 17 of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, 
34(2) International Review of Law, Computers & Technology (2020), 153-182 and 
Christina Angelopoulos, & João Pedro Quintais, Fixing Copyright Reform: A Better 
Solution to Online Infringement, 10(2) Journal of Intellectual Property, Information 
Technology and E-Commerce Law (2019), 147-172. 
7 A number of extensive studies have been published on the various aspects on Article 
17, including its effects on fundamental rights, see e.g. Matthias Leistner, European 
Copyright Licensing and Infringement Liability Under Art. 17 DSM-Directive 
Compared to Secondary Liability of Content Platforms in the U.S. – Can We Make the 
New European System a Global Opportunity Instead of a Local Challenge? Zeitschrift 
für Geistiges Eigentum/Intellectual Property Journal (ZGE/IPJ), Issue 2, p. 123-214, 
available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3572040 (2020), 1-78; Julia Reda, 
Joschka Selinger, & Michael Servatius, Article 17 of the Directive on Copyright in the 
Digital Single Market: a Fundamental Rights Assessment (Study for Gesellschaft für 
Freiheitsrechte), (December 2020), available at SSRN: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3732223; Martin Senftleben, & 
Christina Angelopoulos, The Odyssey of the Prohibition on General Monitoring 
Obligations on the Way to the Digital Services Act: Between Article 15 of the E-
Commerce Directive and Article 17 of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single 
Market (October 22, 2020), available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3717022; 
Gerald Spindler, Art. 17 DSM-RL und dessen Vereinbarkeit mit primärem Europarecht. 
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basic intermediary liability regime under the Directive on electronic 
commerce (ECD)8 and under the Directive on copyright and related rights 
in the information society (InfoSoc Directive)9 on the exercise of FR by 
intermediaries, rightholders and users of hosting platforms has been 
subject to a number of preliminary rulings by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU).10 In this jurisprudence, the Court has ruled out 
that online intermediaries can incur obligations requiring them to install 
general monitoring and filtering mechanisms to identify and block 
copyright-infringing content.11 
 
Zugleich ein Beitrag zu Umsetzungsmöglichkeiten, 122(3) Gewerblicher Rechtschutz 
und Urheberrecht (2020), 253-261; Gerald Spindler, Upload-Filter: 
Umsetzungsoptionen zu Art. 17 DSM-RL, Computer und Recht (2020), 50-59, further 
suggestions and commentaries have been made by a wider range of relevant 
organizations and groups of scholars, also on plans for national implementation, see for 
example: The European Copyright Society, Comment of the European Copyright 
Society. Selected Aspects of Implementing Article 17 of the Directive on Copyright in 
the Digital Single Market into National Law, 11(2) Journal of Intellectual Property, 
Information Technology and E-Commerce Law (2020), 115-131; ALAI, DRAFT 
OPINION on certain aspects of the implementation of Article 17 of Directive (EU) 
2019/790 of 17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in the digital single market, 
available at: https://www.alai.org/en/assets/files/resolutions/200330-opinion-article-17-
directive-2019_790-en.pdf, accessed: 25.01.2021; ALAI, DRAFT OPINION on certain 
aspects of the implementation of Article 17 of Directive (EU) 2019/790 of 17 April 2019 
on copyright and related rights in the digital single market, available at: 
https://www.alai.org/en/assets/files/resolutions/200330-opinion-article-17-directive-
2019_790-en.pdf, accessed: 25.01.2021; Hilty et al., Gesetz über die urheberrechtliche 
Verantwortlichkeit von Diensteanbietern für das Teilen von Online-Inhalten 
(Urheberrechts-Diensteanbieter-Gesetz – UrhDaG)Stellungnahme zum 
Referentenentwurf vom 2. September 2020, available at: 
https://www.ip.mpg.de/fileadmin/ipmpg/content/stellungnahmen/Stellungnahme_UrhD
aG_Referententwurf_MPI.pdf, accessed: 25.01.2021. 
8 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 
on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic 
commerce, in the Internal Market (’Directive on electronic commerce’), OJ L 178, 
17.7.2000, p. 1–16 (e-Commerce Directive). 
9 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 
on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information 
society, OJ L 167, 22.6.2001, p. 10-19 (InfoSoc Directive). This directive does not 
foresee a specific liability standard, but simply refers to the liability regime established 
by the e-Commerce directive (Recital 16). 
10 See for example CJEU, Judgment of 29.01.2008, Promusicae, Case C-275/06, 
EU:C:2008:54; CJEU, Judgment of 24.11.2011, Scarlet Extended, Case C-70/10, 
EU:C:2011:771; CJEU, Judgment of 16.06.2012, SABAM v Netlog, Case C-360/10, 
EU:C:2012:85; CJEU, Judgment of 27.03.2014, UPC Telekabel Wien, Case C-314/12, 
EU:C:2014:192; CJEU, Judgement of 15.09.2016, Mc Fadden, C-484/14, 
EU:C:2016:689; see also the ongoing proceedings in YouTube, for which the AG 
delivered his Opinion, AG Saugmandsgaard Øe, Opinion of 16.07.2020, YouTube, 
Joined Cases C-682/18 and C-683/18, EU:C:2020:586. 
11 See Stefan Kulk, & Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, Filtering for copyright 
enforcement in Europe after the Sabam cases, 34(11) European Intellectual Property 
Review (2012), 791-795; Christina Angelopoulos, Are blocking injunctions against ISPs 
allowed in Europe? Copyright enforcement in the post-Telekabel EU legal landscape, 
9(10) Journal of Intellectual Property Law (2014), 812-821; see for further references 
Stefan Kulk, Internet Intermediaries and Copyright Law, Towards a Future-proof EU 
Legal Framework, (Ridderprint:Alblasserdam, 2018); Aleksandra Kuczerawy, 
Intermediary Liability and Freedom of Expression in the EU: From Concepts to 
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The extent to which intermediaries, and hosting providers in 
particular, can incur liability for infringements committed by their users 
was discussed intensively leading up to the adoption of the CDSM 
Directive.12 It comes therefore as no surprise that, immediately after its 
adoption, the provision of the CDSM Directive that re-balances the 
delicate distribution of duties and responsibilities between rightholders, 
users and intermediaries has been challenged on FR grounds by the Polish 
Government before the CJEU.13 
At the core of this discussion lies the question under which 
circumstances and in which way intermediaries are obliged to take 
measures to ensure that copyright and related rights are not infringed via 
their services. While the regime of the ECD provided for relatively broad 
‘safe harbours’,i.e. liability exclusions for intermediaries,14 the new 
sectoral regime under Article 17 CDSM Directive redesigned liability 
 
Safeguards, (Intersentia:Cambridge, 2018); For a comparative perspective: Folkert 
Wilman, The Responsibility of Online Intermediaries for Illegal User Content in the EU 
and the US, (Edward Elgar Publishing:Cheltenham, Northampton, 2020). 
12 See e.g. The European Copyright Society (2020) and Joao Pedro Quintais et al., 
Safeguarding User Freedoms in Implementing Article 17 of the Copyright in the Digital 
Single Market Directive: Recommendations from European Academics, 10(3) Journal 
of Intellectual Property, Information Technology and E-Commerce Law (2019), 277-
282. 
13 CJEU, Action brought on 24 May 2019- Republic of Poland v European Parliament 
and Council of the European Union, (Case C-401/19). According to the pleas in law and 
main arguments, “the Republic of Poland seeks the annulment of Article 17(4)(b) and 
Article 17(4)(c), in fine” (…), or, “should the Court find that the contested provisions 
cannot be deleted from Article 17 of Directive (EU) 2019/790 without substantively 
changing the rules contained in the remaining provisions of that article, the Republic of 
Poland claims that the Court should annul Article 17 of Directive (EU) 2019/790 in its 
entirety”. 
14 Articles 12-15 ECD exempt information society service providers from liability if they 
comply with the respective conditions. Particularly relevant for hosting providers is 
Article 14 ECD, which provides that information society service providers who offer a 
service which “consists of the storage of information provided by a recipient of the 
service” are not liable for such information if “(a) the provider does not have actual 
knowledge of illegal activity or information and, as regards claims for damages, is not 
aware of facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is 
apparent; or (b) the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts 
expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information.” Article 15 provides 
further that services that fall under Articles 12-14 shall not be required to generally 
monitor or filter information or to actively seek information that could indicate illegal 
activities; see for a detailed analysis and further references: Mark D. Cole, Christina 
Etteldorf & Carsten Ullrich, Cross-Border Dissemination of Online Content, (Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 2020), pp. 188-200, see for a good summary Giancarlo Frosio, & 
Christophe Geiger, Taking Fundamental Rights Seriously in the Digital Service Act’s 
Platform Liability Regime, available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=37477
56 (2020), 1-44, p. 8; and Annemarie Bridy, The Price of Closing the ‘Value Gap’: How 
the Music Industry Hacked EU Copyright Reform, 22(2) Vanderbilt Journal of 
Entertainment and Technology Law (2020), 323-358. See in general with many further 
inspiring contributions the comprehensive volume edited by Giancarlo Frosio, The 




exemptions for OCSSPs as a specific class of intermediaries.15  
In 2012, SABAM v Netlog16 set out the parameters of filtering 
obligations in the triangular relationship between the various FR of 
rightholders, users and intermediaries in the context of the liability regime 
of the ECD.17 In SABAM v Netlog, the CJEU determined that hosting 
providers cannot be required to install systems that monitor or filter “most 
of the information stored by the hosting service provider” to avoid all 
present and future infringements. The expenses incurred by such an 
obligation would “result in a serious infringement of the freedom of the 
hosting service provider to conduct its business since it would require that 
hosting service provider to install a complicated, costly, permanent 
computer system at its own expense”.18 The Court further stressed that a 
general monitoring obligation would infringe the rights of users of hosting 
services, most notably the right to protection of personal data and the right 
to receive and impart information.19 As a result, a general monitoring 
obligation as a measure to protect the property rights of copyright holders 
does not strike a fair balance between the various FR concerned. 
The statutory language of Article 17 is relatively vague and merely 
requires that OCSSPs “ensure the unavailability of specific works”.20 
Although the text of the directive avoids references to monitoring or 
filtering, it is widely agreed among commentators that some sort of 
automated content control will be necessary to fulfil the obligations 
arising under Article 17(4) CDSM.21 This potentially stands in 
contradiction to the interpretation of Article 16 EU Charter as interpreted 
in SABAM v Netlog and the express prohibition of general filtering and 
 
15 See e.g. for a comprehensive summary Quintais, EIPR (2020). 
16 CJEU, C-360/10 SABAM v Netlog, see also CJEU, C-70/10 Scarlet Extended for an 
almost identical judgment on the obligations of internet access providers. 
17 CJEU, C-360/10 SABAM v Netlog, paras. 39-50. 
18 CJEU, C-360/10 SABAM v Netlog, para. 46; see further for a more nuanced assessment 
of the impact of Article 17 on the right to conduct a business of platform operators  Reda, 
& Selinger, Article 17’s impact on freedom to conduct a business – Part 1, available at: 
http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2021/01/18/article-17s-impact-on-freedom-to-
conduct-a-business-part-1/, accessed: 25.01.2021 and part 2, available at: 
http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2021/01/19/article-17s-impact-on-freedom-to-
conduct-a-business-part-2/, accessed: 25.01.2021. 
19 CJEU, C-360/10 SABAM v Netlog, paras. 47-50. 
20 Article 17(4)(b) CDSM Directive. 
21 See e.g. Karina Grisse, After the storm—examining the final version of Article 17 of 
the new Directive (EU) 2019/790, 14(11) Journal of Intellectual Property Law & 
Practice (2019), 887-899, p. 894; Spindler, GRUR (2020), p. 259; Giancarlo Frosio, & 
Sunimal Mendis, Monitoring and Filtering: European Reform or Global Trend, in: 
Giancarlo Frosio (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Online Intermediary Liability, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. 561 sq; Sebastian Schwemer, & Jens Schovsbo, 
What is Left of User Rights? – Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement and Free Speech in 
the Light of the Article 17 Regime, in: Paul Torremans (ed.), Intellectual Property Law 
and Human Rights, (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2020), p. 574: 
“Given the practical infeasibility of handling a large number of user uploads, the 
difficulty in identifying previously blocked content without technical means (…), the 
use of such algorithmic solutions is likely, akin to a de facto imposition”. 
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monitoring obligations for intermediaries22 and specifically OCSSPs.23 
The new Article 17 regime expressly overrides the existing safe 
harbour provision of the ECD and the InfoSoc Directive24 and 
foreshadows broader obligations for online intermediaries in the EU’s 
Digital Services Act currently under discussion.25 Under the ECD-regime, 
intermediaries incurred an obligation to remove content upon notification. 
Article 17 establishes a system based on cooperation between rightholders 
and users that includes elements of the ECD-regime. Pursuant to Article 
17(1) OCSSPs perform relevant acts of communication to the public in 
relation to content uploaded by their users. For these acts, OCSSPs must 
make “best efforts” to obtain authorization from the relevant 
rightholders.26 Failure to obtain authorization triggers an obligation to 
ensure that works or other subject matter for which authorization could 
not be obtained are made unavailable on a hosting platform with the help 
of information provided by rightholders.27 To achieve this outcome, 
OCSSPS must undertake “best efforts”, a standard of care that also 
applies to a secondary obligation which, in its formulation, resembles, but 
is not identical to, the liability exemption of Article 14 ECD.28 Pursuant 
to Article 17(4)(c) OCSSPS must “in any event” expeditiously remove 
infringing content after notification and ensure its future unavailability, 
thus establishing what has been called a “notice and stay down” 
mechanism.29 The requirement to make content unavailable, i.e. to block 
and to filter user uploads, clashes with the guarantees provided in Article 
 
22 Article 15(1) ECD. 
23 Article 17(8) CDSM Directive. 
24 Cf. Article 17(3) CDSM Directive; it is interesting to note that this results in a conflict 
between the e-Commerce Directive and the InfoSoc Directive with the CDSM Directive 
as the liability regime of the latter is different from the former two. This is surprising, as 
Article 1(2) of the CDSM Directive clearly states that “except in the cases referred to in 
Article 24, this Directive shall leave intact and shall in no way affect existing rules laid 
down in the directives currently in force in this area, in particular Directives 96/9/EC, 
2000/31/EC, 2001/29/EC, 2006/115/EC, 2009/24/EC, 2012/28/EU and 2014/26/EU”. 
Thus, there is, on the one side, the liability regime for OCSSPs as defined by the CDSM 
Directive and, on the other, the liability regime for other intermediaries as defined by the 
e-Commerce Directive. How these incoherencies will be solved by national legislators 
and courts when it comes to implementing the Directive is unclear, but this contradiction 
seems hard to reconcile with the principle of legal certainty that governs EU law. 
25 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on a Single Market For Digital Services (Digital Services Act) an amending 
Directive 200/21/EC, COM(2020) 825 final, Brussels, European Commission, 
15.12.2020, on FR and intermediary liability under the Digital Services Act see the 
recent study by Frosio, & Geiger, SSRN (2020) and Christina Angelopoulos, 
Intermediary Liability, Fundamental Rights and the Digital Services Act (Weekend 
Edition no. 42), available at: https://eulawlive.com/weekend-edition/weekend-edition-
no42/, accessed: 25.01.2021. 
26 Article 17(4)(a) CDSM Directive. 
27 Article 17(4)(b) CDSM Directive. 
28 Contrary to the liability exemption of Article 14 ECD, the ‘best efforts’ obligations 
arising under Article 17 CDSM Directive do not require knowledge to incur liability. 
29 See e.g. Aleksandra Kuczerawy, From ‘Notice and Takedown’ to ‘Notice and Stay 
Down’: Risks and Safeguards for Freedom of Expression, in: Giancarlo Frosio (ed.), The 




17(7), pursuant to which users of hosting platforms shall not be prevented 
from uploading lawful consent and, in particular, to exercise certain 
exceptions and limitations specifically provided for in Article 17(7)(a) & 
(b).30 Against this background, it is appropriate and necessary to review 
the rifts created by monitoring and filtering obligations in the FR 
landscape of the EU.31 
The new liability regime and its inherent conflicts raises two 
important questions. First, whether Article 17 CDSM and in particular the 
‘best efforts’ obligation creates a fair balance between the various 
interests and FR concerned, in particular with regard to user’s rights that 
Article 17(7) mandates to safeguard. Second, if the first question is 
answered in the affirmative, how could procedural mechanisms guarantee 
that a balance that has only been sketched the CDSM Directive is 
maintained in practice. 
This study proceeds as follows: First, we will briefly outline the 
general European framework of FR protection, (2.1.) and the principle of 
proportionality which serves as the mechanism to reconcile conflicts 
between those rights and between rights and other interests (2.2.) as it 
applies to copyright law. Subsequently, we outline the scope of protection 
of the relevant FR (2.3.) and the general principles of market 
harmonization and legal certainty (2.4). Second, we will provide a brief 
overview of the mechanisms of Article 17 CDSM (3.1.) and of the 
technological aspects of automated filtering and monitoring and its 
limitations (3.2.). Third, we will in detail examine the effects of 
automated filtering mechanisms and notice and stay-down obligations on 
the various FR with particular reference to Article 17 CDSM (3.5.). 
Fourth, we review suggested solutions on how to implement Article 17 in 
compliance with FR (3.6.) before briefly summarizing our findings (4.) 
 
 FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS OF PLATFORM LIABILITY 
Mass-scale online copyright enforcement and FR are difficult to 
reconcile. In fact, in order to identify and control potentially infringing 
content, given the extremely large amount of content uploaded on 
platforms every day, monitoring and filtering information seems 
unavoidable at least to some extent.32 This in turn potentially affects the 
rights of users and the general public to disclosure of information and 
restricts access to information made available on online platforms. 
 
30 For further discussion, see e.g. Schwemer, & Schovsbo, What is Left of User Rights? 
– Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement and Free Speech in the Light of the Article 17 
Regime in: Torremans (2020), p. 569 sq. 
31 See on this issue Reda et al. (2020); Senftleben, & Angelopoulos, SSRN (October 
2020), p. 17 sq. For a horizontal approach on automated enforcement, platform liability 
and FR, see also Frosio, & Geiger, SSRN (2020), at p. 12 sq. 
32 This position is implicit in the CJEU’s arguments in CJEU, C-70/10 Scarlet Extended 
and CJEU, C-360/10 SABAM v Netlog. By prohibiting general filtering, the Court 




Furthermore, in order to be able to cope with obligations to identify and 
monitor copyright infringement, platform operators are obliged to install 
costly mechanisms involving technical and human resources, which can 
have severe implications on their business in particular (but not only) for 
small or middle-sized companies33. 
The CJEU has developed the scope of the obligations of online 
intermediaries and the rights of users in relation to copyright enforcement 
with reference to, and in the light of FR,34 which is why a discussion on 
monitoring and filtering obligations cannot be decoupled from a FR 
discourse.35 As a norm of secondary EU law, Article 17 CDSM must be 
interpreted in the light of primary EU law, which includes FR. 36  
 
 The systemic role of fundamental rights in the EU legal order 
FR are an integral element in the EU’s constitutional order. Prior to 
their codification in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EUCFR),37 
the CJEU developed FR as general principles from the common 
 
33 See in this sense, Evan Engstrom, & Nick Feamster, The Limits of Filtering: A Look 
at the Functionality & Shortcomings of Content Detection Tools, Available at: 
https://www.engine.is/the-limits-of-filtering (2017), accessed 25.01.2021, p. 22 sq. 
(according to which “filtering tools are prohibitively expensive for many small OSPs” 
and giving examples of the costs of filtering systems). 
34 See specifically CJEU, C-70/10 Scarlet Extended; CJEU, C-360/10 SABAM v Netlog; 
CJEU, C-484/14 Mc Fadden and CJEU, C-314/12 UPC Telekabel Wien, further the 
ECtHR assessed intermediary liability with respect to defamatory content in ECtHR 
(Grand Chamber), 16 June 2015, case of Delfi AS v. Estonia, Appl. no. 64569/09 and 
ECtHR (Fourth Section), 2 February 2016, case of Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók 
Egyesülete and Index.hu Zrt v. Hungary, Appl. no. 22947/13; see specifically Christophe 
Geiger, & Elena Izyumenko, The Role Of Human Rights In Copyright Enforcement 
Online: Elaborating A Legal Framework For Website Blocking, 32(1) American 
University International Law Review (2016), 43-115. 
35 Cf. Matthias Leistner, European Copyright Licensing and Infringement Liability 
Under Art. 17 DSM-Directive Compared to Secondary Liability of Content Platforms in 
the U.S. – Can We Make the New European System a Global Opportunity Instead of a 
Local Challenge?, 12(2) Zeitschrift für Geistiges Eigentum/Intellectual Property Journal 
(2020), 123-214, p. 17. 
36 On the implication of fundamental rights for the interpretation of copyright law see 
Christophe Geiger, “Constitutionalising” Intellectual Property Law? The Influence of 
Fundamental Rights on Intellectual Property in the European Union, 37(4) International 
Review of Intellectual Property and Competition (2006), 371-406; Christophe Geiger, 
Copyright’s Fundamental Rights Dimension at EU Level, in: Estelle Derclaye (ed.), 
Research Handbook on the Future of EU Copyright, (Cheltenham, Northampton: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009), 27-48; Christophe Geiger, Fundamental Rights as 
Common Principles of European (and International) Intellectual Property Law, in: 
Ansgar Ohly (ed.), Common Principles of European Intellectual Property Law, 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012) 223-238; Christophe Geiger, Reconceptualizing the 
Constitutional Dimension of Intellectual Property- An Update, in: Paul Torremans (ed.), 
Intellectual Property Law and Human Rights, (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law 
International, 2020), 115-161; Michael Goldhammer, Taking Constitutionalization 
Seriously: European IP Law, Weak Fundamental Rights and the Network of Courts, 
GRUR Int. 2021 (forthcoming). 




constitutional traditions of the Member States.38 FR therefore sit at the top 
of the EU’s hierarchy of norms along with the Treaties39 and the general 
principles of EU law.40 All FR of the EUCFR are of equal value and no 
hierarchy exists between them,41 their scope corresponds to that of the 
respective rights provided for by the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR).42 This 
relationship is also illustrated by regular references by the CJEU to 
judgments by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).43 
 
1. The Court’s standard of review 
The intensity of the Court’s review of secondary copyright legislation 
in the light of the EU Charter differs.44 In cases in which the CJEU is 
asked to interpret EU law in the light of the Charter, the Luxembourg 
court tends to give instructions to the national courts and then leaves it 
“for the national court to ascertain” the correct application of national law 
in the light of EU law, including the EU Charter. However, the more 
precise the question submitted by national courts through the preliminary 
reference route, the more likely is the Court to engage in a more detailed 
analysis of balance of rights.45 
 
2. Addressees of EU fundamental rights 
According to Article 51 EUCFR “[t]he provisions of [the] Charter are 
addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union 
 
38 CJEU, Judgment of 14.05.1974, Nold, Case 4/73, EU:C:1974:51, para 13; see in 
relation to copyright: CJEU, Judgment of 12.09.2006, Laserdisken II, Case C-479/04, 
EU:C:2006:549, para. 61. 
39 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 13–
45 (TEU); Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 47–390 (TFEU). 
40 Paul Craig, & Gráinne de Búrca, EU Law. Text, Cases and Materials, (Oxford, New 
York: Oxford University Press 2020), pp. 142-144. 
41 For a diverging view see Alexander Peukert, The fundamental right to (intellectual) 
property and the discretion of the legislature, in: Christophe Geiger (ed.), Research 
Handbook on Human Rights and Intellectual Property, (Cheltenham, Northampton: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015), 132-148, who argues that the right to property should 
not be considered at the same level as, for example, the right to freedom of expression 
due to the “unique structure” of property rights and their existence and scope “as 
‘creatures’ of the legislature”. 
42 Article 52(3) EUCFR. 
43 See for example CJEU, Judgment of 29.07.2019, Pelham and others, Case C-476/17, 
EU:C:2019:624, para. 34.  
44 Good examples for a thorough review are Sky Österreich (CJEU, Judgment of 
22.01.2013, Sky Österreich, Case C-283/11, EU:C:2013:28) and, to a limited extent, the 
ruling in Luksan (CJEU, Judgment of 9.02.2012, Luksan, Case C-277/10, 
EU:C:2012:65). Both cases, albeit indirectly via the preliminary reference procedure 
under Article 267 TFEU, challenged the validity of a provision of EU law or one of 
national law that implemented EU law. 
45 See for example, CJEU, C-70/10 Scarlet Extended, paras. 41-54 and CJEU, C-484/14 
Mc Fadden, paras. 80-101, see also Kranenborg, in: Peers, Hervey, Kenner, & Ward, 
2014, Article 8, para. 08.42. 
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(…) and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union 
law.”46 This means that the provisions of the Charter bind the European 
legislature in all its activities and EU legislation must comply with FR. 
Member States are only bound by the Charter when implementing EU 
law.47 The CJEU has also underlined that the courts of the Member States 
must have regard to EU FR when applying national law which serves to 
implement obligation under EU law.48 In situations that are not fully 
governed by EU law, Member States remain free to apply national FR 
standards as long as their application does not compromise the primacy, 
unity and effectiveness of EU law.49 
 
3. Challenging fundamental rights incompatibilities 
The consequences of FR infringements depend on the level at which 
they occur. If an act of one or several EU institutions infringes a FR of 
the EU legal order50, it can be challenged before the CJEU.51 Legislation 
in particular can be subject to a challenge by one of the institutions or a 
Member State under the procedure of Article 263 TFEU.52 For this 
purpose, a party requesting review of a provision of a legislative act must 
demonstrate that the provision in question constitutes an “infringement of 
the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application.”53 
Individuals can challenge a legislative measure, or any act of the 
institutions for that purpose, indirectly via the preliminary reference 
 
46 Article 51(1) EUCFR. 
47 For example, Member States must transpose secondary legislation (i.e. directives) into 
their national law in full compliance with the FR of the EU Charter. Therefore, national 
legislatures must ensure that their transposition of secondary legislation relies on an 
interpretation that ensures that a fair balance is struck between the various FR protected 
under EU law. See e.g. CJEU, C-275/06 Promusicae para. 70; CJEU, Judgment of 18 
October 2018, Bastei Lübbe, Case CC-149/17, EU:C:2018:841, para. 45, see also CJEU, 
Judgment of 16.07.2015, Coty Germany, Case C-580/13, EU:C:2015:485, para. 34. 
More generally see Craig, & de Búrca, EU Law. Text, Cases and Materials (2020), pp. 
430-431. 
48 CJEU, C-70/10 Scarlet Extended; CJEU, C-360/10 SABAM v Netlog, but also CJEU, 
C-484/14 Mc Fadden. 
49 CJEU, Judgment of 29.07.2019, Funke Medien NRW, Case C-469/17, 
EU:C:2019:623, para. 32. 
50 E.g. by imposing a measure that in itself does not respect FR or, which in its particular 
formulation does not strike a fair balance between various interests involved. 
51 See e.g. the challenge brought by Poland against parts of Article 17(4) CDSM, in 
which it alleges that the obligation to filter content to prevent copyright infringements 
infringes the rights of users to receive and impart information, CJEU, Application of 
26.07.2019, Case C-401/19, , see on this issue Bernd Justin Jütte, Finding the Balance 
in Copyright Law: Internal and External Control Through Fundamental Rights, in: Paul 
Torremans (ed.), Intellectual Property Law and Human Rights, (4th ed., Alphen aan den 
Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2020), pp. 481-482. 
52 Under Article 263 challenges by individuals are nearly impossible, especially in 
relation to generally applicable legislation. An individual application would have to 
demonstrate direct and individual concern in order to challenge a directive, see Craig, & 
de Búrca, EU Law. Text, Cases and Materials (2020), pp. 546 sq. 
53 Article 264, second sentence TFEU; a direct challenge to an act must be brought within 
two months of the publication of the measure (Article 264, sixth sentence TFEU). 
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procedure. Article 267 gives the CJEU competence to rule on “the validity 
(…) of acts of the institutions (…) of the Union.”54 
Article 6(1) TEU requires that the EU must respect FR as laid down 
in the EU Charter and also guaranteed by the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.55 
Accordingly, legislation that is incompatible with the EU Charter, any FR 
included in the ECHR, or any general principle of EU law can be 
challenged, as the Polish government has done in relation to certain 
aspects of Article 17 CDSM Directive. To that effect, the CJEU 
established in Schrems II that any EU legislative measure that constitutes 
an interference with one or several FR must define the scope of the 
limitation it has on the right concerned.56 
Likewise, Member States, by failing to properly implement a 
directive, can be found to be in violation of the Charter. A failure to 
implement can include a failure to transpose a directive or a part of a 
directive. However, Member States can also be sanctioned for failure to 
implement a legislative measure in compliance with EU FR. This would 
assume that the EU act itself complies with FR, but the exercise of 
discretion left to the Member States when implementing the act has been 
exercised to the effect that the implementing law does not fully respect 
FR. This can be challenged, ordinarily by the Commission (and 
exceptionally by another Member States),57 before the CJEU which can 
find a Member State in violation of its obligation under the EU Treaties. 
Such a challenge would still be possible, even if the Polish challenge were 
to be unsuccessful, to ‘correct’ national implementations and enable the 
CJEU to intervene (again) at a later point. Given the largely diverging 
approaches to implementing the CDSM Directive, such a (further) 
challenge is certainly not to be excluded.58 
However, not every restriction of FR automatically constitutes a 
 
54 Article 267, first sentence, subparagraph (a) TFEU; see for example CJEU, Judgment 
of 01.03.2011, Test-Achats, Case C-236/09, EU:C:2011:100, see also CJEU, Judgment 
of 08.04.2014, Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others, Case C-293/12, 
EU:C:2014:238 and CJEU, Judgment of 06.10.2015, Schrems, Case C-362/14, 
EU:C:2015:650.  
55 Article 6(2) TEU. 
56 CJEU, Judgment of 16.07.2020, Facebook Ireland and Schrems, Case C-311/18, 
EU:C:2020:559, para. 175. 
57 However, other Member States would first have to bring the matter before the 
Commission. Only if the Commission fails to act, by delivering an opinion, within three 
months can a Member State bring proceedings against another Member Sate before the 
CJEU (see Article 259 TFEU).  
58 As Oreste Pollicino, Giovanni Maria Riccio and Marco Bassini note in the introduction 
of their timely edited collection, Copyright and Fundamental Rights in the Digital Age, 
A Comparative Analysis in Search of a Common Constitutional Ground, (Cheltenham, 
Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2020), p. 1: “The challenges that Member 
States will have to face in the implementation process of the DSM Directive largely 
derive from the strained relationship between copyright and other competing rights such 
as freedom of speech, data protection and freedom to conduct business”. For an overview 




failure to fulfil an obligation under the Treaties or other higher-ranking 
EU law. In principle, FR can be limited as long as their essence is 
respected.59 Furthermore, any limitation of a FR right must respect the 
principle of proportionality. 60 
 
 Proportionality: The CJEU’s balancing methodology 
The proportionality test is an analytical tool to determine the 
permissibility of limiting certain rights. In Europe, it is applied by the 
ECtHR and the CJEU to reconcile competing interests, often in the 
context of FR as they are guaranteed and protected under the ECHR and 
the EUCFR.61 
The test of proportionality is divided into three steps.62 First, the test 
requires to determine whether the contested measure is appropriate. To 
meet this condition the measure must pursue a legitimate aim and must be 
suitable to achieve that aim.63 Second, the measure must be necessary, in 
other words whether the aim could be achieved by less onerous means.64 
The third stage consists of a balancing exercise and is also referred to as 
‘proportionality strictu sensu’. At this stage of the review the various 
interests are balanced against each other. 
The nature of the test is complex65 and its application by either court 
does not perfectly reflect its formulation. Especially in multipolar 
relationships of competing rights the test reveals its more flexible 
nature.66 In the practice of the ECtHR, the test leaves Member States a 
 
59 Article 52(1) EUCFR; see also to that effect AG Szpunar, Opinion of 12.12.2018, 
Pelham and Others, Case C-476/17, EU:C:2018:1002, para. 98 and AG Szpunar, 
Opinion of 6 June 2018, Bastei Lübbe, Case C-149/17, EU:C:2018:400, para. 38 and 
CJEU, C-580/13 Coty Germany, para. 35. See also on this issue: Martin Husovec, The 
Essence of Intellectual Property Rights Under Article 17(2) of the EU Charter, 20(6) 
German Law Journal (2019), 840-863, with further references. 
60 See further on the influence of this principle on EU copyright law, Ori Fischman Afori, 
Proportionality – A New Mega Standard in European Copyright Law, 45(8) 
International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition (2014), 889-915.  
61 In this function proportionality has also served to determine the scope of individual 
FR, see Jonas Christofferson, Human Rights and balancing: The principle of 
proportionality, in: Christophe Geiger (ed.), Research Handbook on Human Rights and 
Intellectual Property, (Cheltenham, Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015), p. 
19. 
62 For one of the earlier applications of the test see CJEU, Judgment of 13.11.1990, 
Fedesa, Case C-331/88, EU:C:1990:391, paras. 12-18. 
63 This prong of the proportionality test is interpreted broadly; only measures which are 
manifestly inappropriate, see Damian Chalmers, Gareth Davies & Giorgio Monti, 
European Union Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), pp. 387-388. 
64 Article 17 creates an interesting constellation: the ‘necessity’ prong will not only have 
to be considered in relation to the effects it has on users, and arguably rightholders, but 
also on OCSSPs, whose obligation to implement enforcement measures has significant 
effects on their business models. 
65 Christofferson, Human Rights and balancing: The principle of proportionality in: 
Geiger (2015), p. 19. 
66 Cf. Christofferson, Human Rights and balancing: The principle of proportionality in: 
Geiger (2015), p. 24. 
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margin of discretion while ensuring a basic protection of FR.67 In any 
case, at EU level, proportionality is a general principle of EU law and 
therefore must guide the institutions,68 and the Member States in 
implementing EU law. Accordingly, acts of the institutions and the 
Member States are subject to judicial review in the light of the principle 
of proportionality.69 
Proportionality has become increasingly appealing for copyright law. 
In this context, proportionality has almost become synonymous with the 
notion of a ‘fair balance’.70 In particular in a digital or online environment, 
in which the relations between the various interests of rightholders, users 
and intermediaries cannot be precisely formulated into legal norms, 
proportionality plays a decisive role.71  
 
67 Cf. Christofferson, Human Rights and balancing: The principle of proportionality in: 
Geiger (2015), p. 21, this is evidenced by the flexible interpretation of the second step, 
which takes a liberal approach to the concept of ‘least onerous means’. The ECtHR 
leaves member states a large margin of discretion to exercise their legislative and 
regulatory powers while merely considering the second step within the context of the 
other two to ascertain whether the means chosen to achieve a legitimate aim are not 
unreasonable.  
68 The formal requirements to be followed by the institution in applying the principle of 
proportionality are set out in the Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union - PROTOCOLS - Protocol (No 2) on the application of the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality OJ C 115, 9.5.2008, p. 206-209. The CJEU 
is however not always consistent in its application of the test and often folds the third 
stage into one of the first two stages or omits it completely if the test already failed at an 
earlier stage, see Craig, & Búrca, EU Law. Text, Cases and Materials (2020), p. 583. 
69 Cf. Takis Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law, (Oxford, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), p. 655. The principle was introduced as a ground for judicial 
review in CJEU, Judgment of 17.12.1970, Internationale Handelgesellschaft, Case 11-
70, EU:C:1970:114 and since 2009 is has been expressly recognized in Article 5(4) 
TFEU and serves to justify possible limitations to the FR of the Charter (Article 52(1) 
EUCFR). At the institutional level, Article 5 of the Protocol (No 2) on the Application 
of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality obliges the legislator to demonstrate 
that a legislative proposal complies with the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality. See, for example, the impact assessment for the CDSM Directive 
European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document. Impact Assessment on 
the modernisation of EU copyright rules. Accompanying the Document Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on copyright in the Digital 
Single Market and Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council laying down rules on the exercise of copyright and related rights applicable to 
certain online transmissions of broadcasting organisations and retransmissions of 
television and radio programmes, SWD(2016) 301 final, Brussels, European 
Commission, 14.9.2016, at pp. 119, 155, 195-195; It is worth noting that in this 
document the impact of the proposed legislative acts on fundamental right is examined 
separately from proportionality assessments. 
70 Cf. Peter Teunissen, The balance puzzle: the ECJ’s method of proportionality review 
for copyright injunctions, 40(9) European Intellectual Property Review (2018), 579-593, 
p. 581, Christofferson, Human Rights and balancing: The principle of proportionality in: 
Geiger (2015), p 35, and Peter Oliver, & Christopher Stothers, Intellectual Property 
under the Charter: are the Court’s scales properly calibrated?, 54(2) Common Market 
Law Review (2017), 517-565, p. 546, all with references to CJEU, C-283/11 Sky 
Österreich, paras. 50-68. 
71 Fischman Afori describes the role of proportionality as an external standard that 
enables “a constitutional balance to be struck within the copyright-private law sphere. 
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The CJEU regularly interprets the European copyright acquis with 
reference to proportionality.72 Due to the nature of harmonization (i.e. 
mainly by means of directives) the Court uses proportionality to explore 
the internal balance of copyright law and to help national courts shape 
appropriate remedies to fight copyright infringements.73 It is also worth 
 
She also projects a more prominent role with far reaching consequences for substantive 
copyright law. Although she seems to suggest that proportionality would rather take the 
form of an open norm that would guide the judicial development of substantive copyright 
law, (Fischman Afori, IIC (2014), p. 900, see also Christophe Geiger, & Elena 
Izyumenko, Towards a European “Fair Use” Grounded in Freedom of Expression, 35(1) 
American University International Law Review (2019), 1-52) there is no reason to limit 
this role to the judiciary (Fischman Afori, IIC (2014), p. 899). Nevertheless, the role of 
proportionality in EU copyright law is best traced with reference to the jurisprudence of 
the CJEU, see for a comprehensive summary Teunissen, EIPR (2018). For an interesting 
critical approach see also Tuomas Mylly, Regulating with rights proportionality? 
Copyright, fundamental rights and internet in the case law of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, in: Oreste Pollicino, Giovanni Maria Riccio and Marco Bassini (eds.), 
Copyright and Fundamental Rights in the Digital Age, A Comparative Analysis in Search 
of a Common Constitutional Ground, (Cheltenham, Northampton: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2020), p. 54. 
72 Christophe Geiger, The Role of the Court of Justice of the European Union: 
Harmonizing, Creating and sometimes Disrupting Copyright Law in the European 
Union, in: Irini Stamatoudi (ed.), New Developments in EU and International Copyright 
Law, (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2016), 435-446. Likewise, the 
ECtHR makes regular reference to proportionality in the context of intellectual property 
law, e.g. when assessing the appropriateness of criminal sanctions for large scale 
copyright infringements, for example, when it found that a prison sentence and the award 
of damages was not disproportionate to sanction large-scale online copyright 
infringements ECtHR (5th section) of 19 February 2013, case of Fredrik Neij and Peter 
Sunde Kolmisoppi (The Pirate Bay) v. Sweden, Appl. No.nr. 40397/12, under D., see for 
example Bernd Justin Jütte, The Beginning of a (Happy?) Relationship: Copyright and 
Freedom of Expression in Europe, 38(1) European Intellectual Property Review (2016), 
11-22, p. 15. More generally on the use of the proportionality principle by the ECtHR in 
copyright cases, see Christophe Geiger, & Elena Izyumenko, Shaping Intellectual 
Property Rights through Human Rights Adjudication: The Example of the European 
Court of Human Right, 46(3) Mitchell Hamline Law Review (2020), 527-612; Oleg 
Soldatov, Copyright and fundamental rights in European Court of Human Rights case 
law, in: Pollicino, Riccio & Bassini (eds.), Copyright and Fundamental Rights in the 
Digital Age, (2021), p. 99. In another case, the Strasbourg Court considered the 
obligations of an online news portal to moderate and filter harmful speech. It found a 
moderate financial fine to be proportionate for failure to expeditiously remove harmful 
and offensive speech (ECtHR (Grand Chamber), 16 June 2015, case of Delfi AS v. 
Estonia, Appl. no. 64569/09, paras. 140-161). The ECtHR stressed that the extreme 
nature of the speech, in other words the intensity of the violation of the right to private 
life (Article 8 ECHR) was a decisive factor in coming to this conclusion. However, it 
also stressed that the relatively low fine imposed by the national court, as well as the 
nature of the applicant, as a professional operator of a large online news portal, were 
relevant considerations (ECtHR (Grand Chamber), 16 June 2015, case of Delfi AS v. 
Estonia, Appl. no. 64569/09, para. 160). 
73 See for example CJEU, C-275/06 Promusicae; CJEU, C-70/10 Scarlet Extended; 
CJEU, C-360/10 SABAM v Netlog; CJEU, C-314/12 UPC Telekabel Wien; CJEU, C-
484/14 Mc Fadden; CJEU, CC-149/17 Bastei Lübbe, but also reference to 
proportionality pre-Lisbon in CJEU, C-479/04 Laserdisken II, para. 64; See for 
overviews of the balancing case-law Ole-Andreas Rognstad, Property Aspects of 
Intellectual Property, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2018), pp. 184-189, 
Martin Husovec, Intellectual Property Rights and Integration by Conflict: The Past, 
Present and Future, 18 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies (2016), 239-269 
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noting that it often describes the functional steps of the principle of 
proportionality, without expressly referring to it, and instead stresses the 
necessity to “strike a fair balance”.74 
In particular in a FR constellation such as the one underlying Article 
17 of the CDSM Directive, proportionality plays an important role in 
reflecting on the limitations on FR of rightholders, platform operators and 
users. In order to conduct a proportionality assessment, it is, first, 
instrumental to map the relevant FR, before applying the proportionality 
analysis to the legal mechanism of Article 17. 
 
 The relevant fundamental rights with regard to platform liability 
The competing FR in copyright law, in particular in relation to online 
enforcement, have most recently been summarized by AG 
Saugmandsgaard Øe in the YouTube case:75  
 
“I note in this regard that in SABAM the Court ruled that 
imposing on a platform operator a general obligation to filter the 
information that it stores would not only be incompatible with 
Article 15(1) of Directive 2000/31, but also would not strike a 
‘fair balance’ between the protection of the intellectual property 
right enjoyed by rightholders and that of the freedom to conduct a 
business enjoyed by service providers pursuant to Article 16 of the 
Charter. Such an injunction would result in a serious infringement 
of that freedom since it would require that operator to install a 
complicated, costly, permanent computer system at its own 
expense. In addition, such an obligation to carry out general 
filtering would undermine the freedom of expression of the users 
of that platform under Article 11 of the Charter, since the filtering 
tool might not distinguish adequately between illegal content and 
legal content, with the result that its introduction could lead to the 
blocking of the latter category of content. I will add that such a 
result would introduce a risk of undermining online creativity, 
which would be contrary to Article 13 of the Charter. The danger 
in that regard is that maximum protection of certain forms of 
intellectual creativity is to the detriment of other forms of 
 
and Teunissen, EIPR (2018). However, the methodological approaches chosen by the 
Court have been criticized. While it permanently highlights the importance and centrality 
of proportionality, the Court fails to provide guidance on how this important role should 
be exercised, see e.g. Ole-Andreas Rognstad, Property Aspects of Intellectual Property 
(2018), p. 192; Teunissen, EIPR (2018), p. 593; see however the more structured 
analysis, for example, by AG Cruz Villalón in UPC Telekabel, in which he neatly 
outlines the appropriateness, necessity and proportionality of a blocking order: AG Cruz 
Villalón, Opinion of 26.11.2013, UPC Telekabel Wien, Case C-314/12, EU:C:2013:781. 
74 See for example CJEU, C-70/10 Scarlet Extended, paras. 45-46. 
75 AG Saugmandsgaard Øe, C-683/18 YouTube, paras. 240-244 (references omitted); see 
also Teunissen, EIPR (2018), p. 581; and with regard to platform liability, Frosio, & 
Geiger, SSRN (2020), p. 14 sq. 
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creativity which are also positive for society.” 
 
1. Freedom of expression and information, freedom of the arts 
The right to freedom of expression, as protected by Article 10 ECHR 
and Article 11 EUCFR, protects the right to hold opinions and the right 
to receive an impart information. According to Article 52(3) the scope of 
Article 11 CFREU is congruent with that of Article 10 ECHR.76 Article 
13 EUCFR is closely linked to Article 11 and under the ECHR artistic 
freedom is generally subsumed under the umbrella right of Article 10. The 
right to freedom of expression can be enjoyed by natural as well as legal 
persons, members of the public service of the Member States as well as 
the EU.77 
The right to freedom of expressions covers opinions, information and 
ideas, and in general all types of information that can be communicated. 
Article 11 EUCFR also protects information that offends, shocks or 
disturbs others.78 The importance of the right to freedom of expression for 
a democratic society and an individual’s participation in the public 
exchange of cultural, political and social information and ideas of all 
kinds has been persistently underlined by both courts.79 The ECtHR has 
acknowledged the protection of Article 10 ECHR for fashion 
photography80 and internet peer-to-peer filesharing,81 however 
recognized justified restrictions to the right to freedom of expression in 
order to protect the right to (intellectual) property. Such restrictions are 
permitted if these restrictions are prescribed by law and if they are 
necessary in a democratic society.82 Both courts have also repeatedly 
 
76 It is worth noting that Article 11(2) EUCFR guarantees media freedom and pluralism, 
which are not recognized as independent rights under the ECHR. 
77 CJEU, Judgment of 06.11.2011, Patriciello, Case C-163/10, EU:C:2011:543, para. 31. 
However Member States cannot rely on the protection of Article 11 EUCFR, even if 
indirectly through their officials, see CJEU, Judgment of 07.04.2007, AGM-COS.MET, 
Case C-470/03, EU:C:2007:213, para. 72. 
78 ECtHR (Plenary), 7 December 1976, case of Handyside v. the United Kingdom, Appl. 
no. 5493/72, para. 49, ECtHR, ECtHR (Chamber), 24 May 1988, case of Müller and 
Other v. Switzerland, Appl no. 10737/84, Judgment (1988), 24 May 1988, para. 33; 
CJEU, Judgment of 04.10.1991, Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland 
v Grogan and Others, Case C-159/90, EU:C:1991:378, para. 30, see more recently 
CJEU, C-476/17 Pelham and others, para. 34. 
79 See for example Christophe Geiger, & Elena Izyumenko, Copyright on the Human 
Rights’ Trial: Redefining the Boundaries of Exclusivity Through Freedom of 
Expression, 42(3) International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition (2014), 
316-342; Christophe Geiger, & Izyumenko, Elena, Intellectual Property before the 
European Court of Human Rights, in: Christophe Geiger, Craig Allen Nard, & Xavier 
Seuba (eds.), Intellectual Property and the Judiciary, (Cheltenham, Northampton: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018), p. 36 sq, see also Jütte, E.I.P.R. (2016). 
80 ECtHR (5th section), 10 January 2013, case of Ashby Donald and other v. France, 
Appl. no. 36769/08. 
81 ECtHR (5th section) of 19 February 2013, case of Fredrik Neij and Peter Sunde 
Kolmisoppi (The Pirate Bay) v. Sweden, Appl. nr. 40397/12. 
82 Article 10(2) ECHR; when the right to freedom of expression comes into conflict with 
the right to property, including copyright, this requires a balancing between two FR 
under a proportionality assessment, leading, in effect to some sort of enhanced 
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highlighted the importance of the right to freedom of expression on the 
internet and, conversely the importance of the internet and the various 
services offered through the internet for the exercise of the rights 
protected by Article 10 ECHR and Article 11 EUCFR.83 In Scarlet 
Extended, the CJEU stressed the importance of the internet to receive 
information, in other words the ability of members of the public to receive 
and gather information including storing such information.84 The right to 
receive information is not merely limited to the passive reception of 
information but will also include active research by individuals.85 
The CJEU has found the right to freedom of expression to be an 
obstacle to the free movement of goods and services, which, however, can 
be justified. In discussing whether a public demonstration constituted an 
obstacle to the free movement of goods in Schmidberger, the CJEU 
pointed out that the right to freedom of expression is not absolute “but 
must be viewed in relation to its social purpose.” Accordingly, limitations 
to Article 11 EUCFR are possible as long as they are proportionate and 
leave the essence of the fundamental right intact. In making this 
assessment, Member States enjoy a wide margin of discretion.86 The 
extent of this margin depends, among other factors, on the type 
 
proportionality analysis. See for a detailed analysis Geiger, & Izyumenko, IIC (2014), p. 
316. More generally on the balancing exercise of the ECtHR of intellectual property with 
other FR see Geiger, & Izyumenko, Mitchell Hamline Law Review (2020). 
83 ECtHR (Second Section), 1 December 2015, case of Cengiz and Others v. Turkey, 
Applications nos. 48226/10 and 14027/11, paras 49-50; in this case the Strasbourg Court 
granted victim status to active users of the video-sharing platform YouTube. The Court 
argued that the repercussions of a total block of the platform had significant 
repercussions on their works as academics, as they had used the platform to support their 
teaching activities and to promote their scientific activities and not merely as passive 
users. In a similar case, the Court found a violation of Article 10 in an indiscriminate 
blocking of Google sites, which also affected the website of the applicant (ECtHR 
(Chamber), 18 December 2012, case of Yildirim v. Turkey, Appl. no. 3111/10). 
Conversely, in ECtHR (Second Section), 11 March 2014, case of Akdeniz v. Turkey, 
Appl. no. 20877/10 the Court found the application inadmissible as the applicant were 
mere users of music websites, which moreover had been found to infringe copyright; 
however, the judgment also makes reference to the paramount interest of internet users, 
see further AG Saugmandsgaard Øe, C-683/18 YouTube, para. 241 and CJEU, Judgment 
of 08.09.2016, GS Media, Case C-160/15, EU:C:2016:644, para. 45. 
84 CJEU, C-70/10 Scarlet Extended, para. 50. 
85 AG Trstenjak, Opinion of 05.05.2011, MSD Sharp & Dohme, Case C-316/09, 
EU:C:2010:712, para. 85. On the scope of the right to information, see also Christophe 
Geiger, Droit d’auteur et droit du public à l’information, approche de droit comparé, 
(Paris: LexisNexis, 2004), p. 135; Christophe Geiger, Author’s Right, Copyright and the 
Public’s Right to Information: A Complex Relationship, in: Fiona Macmillan (ed.), New 
Directions in Copyright Law, Vol. 5 (Cheltenham, Northampton: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2007), 24-44. 
86 Cf. CJEU, Judgment of 12.06.2003, Schmidberger, Case C-112/00, EU:C:2003:333, 
paras. 78-80; this wide margin of discretion afforded to the Member States has a long 
tradition in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, see only ECtHR (Plenary), 7 December 
1976, case of Handyside v. the United Kingdom, Appl. no. 5493/72, paras. 48-49, 
ECtHR (5th section), 10 January 2013, case of Ashby Donald and other v. France, Appl. 
no. 36769/08, para. 39 and ECtHR (5th section) of 19 February 2013, case of Fredrik 




information that is subject to the exercise of the right to freedom of 
expression.87 
In Mc Fadden, in which the Court assessed the compatibility of 
several measures to ensure the unavailability of infringing content on a 
wireless network available to the public on the premises of a shop dealing 
in musical equipment, the essence of the right to freedom of information 
was found not to be undermined. In coming to that conclusion, the Court 
considered that the measure taken was the protection of the network by 
means of a password, and it also considered that other possibilities to gain 
access to the internet existed.88 The Court found a strictly targeted 
measure solely aimed at terminating infringing activity proportionate, 
provided that other users of the access provider installing such a measure 
could continue to lawfully access information. If lawful access to 
information were to be disabled through blocking or filtering measure of 
an access provider, an interference with the right to freedom of 
information, as an expression of Article 11 EUCFR, would have been 
unjustified.89 Similarly, the ECtHR in its recent ruling in Kharitonov v. 
Russia argued that the blocking of websites by a state agency that contain 
illegal content must be strictly targeted and any collateral blocking of 
lawful content is likely to violate the right to freedom of expression.90  
Another fundamental right which is potentially affected by copyright 
enforcement measures is the freedom of artistic creativity. The right to 
artistic freedom is protected under the umbrella of Article 10 ECHR and 
by Article 13 EUCFR. While the notion of ‘the arts’ has been defined 
neither by the ECtHR, nor by the CJEU, it is considered to be a broad 
notion covering all forms of artistic expression, including musical and 
visual art.91 According to the ECtHR “[F]reedom of artistic expression 
[…] affords the opportunity to take part in the public exchange of cultural, 
political and social information and ideas of all kinds […]. Those who 
create, perform, distribute or exhibit works of art contribute to the 
exchange of ideas and opinions which is essential for a democratic 
society. Hence there is an obligation on the State not to encroach unduly 
on the author’s freedom of expression […].”92 The distribution or 
 
87 In Neij and Sunde Kolmisoppi (The Pirate Bay) v. Sweden, the ECtHR stated for 
example that the protection under Article 10 ECHR granted to the information, mainly 
unlawful copies of music and films, disseminated via the service operated by the 
applicants could not enjoy the same level of protection as political expression and debate, 
ECtHR (5th section) of 19 February 2013, case of Fredrik Neij and Peter Sunde 
Kolmisoppi (The Pirate Bay) v. Sweden, Appl. nr. 40397/12, under D, see also ECtHR 
(5th section), 10 January 2013, case of Ashby Donald and other v. France, Appl. no. 
36769/08, para. 39. 
88 CJEU, C-484/14 Mc Fadden, para. 92. 
89 CJEU, C-484/14 Mc Fadden, para. 93, see also CJEU, C-314/12 UPC Telekabel Wien, 
para. 56. 
90 ECtHR (Third Section) of 23 June 2020, case of Vladimir Kharitonov v. Russia, Appl. 
no. 10795/14, para. 46.; See also Elena Izyumenko, European Court of Human Rights 
rules that collateral website blocking violates freedom of expression, 15(10) Journal of 
Intellectual Property Law & Practice (2020), 774-775, p. 775. 
91 Debbie Sayers, in: Peers, Hervey, Kenner, & Ward, 2014, para. 13.48. 
92 ECtHR (Second Section), 29 March 2005, case of Alınak v. Turkey, Appl. no 
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exhibition of artistic creation online is therefore also protected and there 
is an obligation on the legislator not to restrict it unduly with copyright 
law.93 Member states enjoy a certain margin of discretion and the 
Strasbourg Court usually focuses on whether the interference was 
necessary and pursued a pressing social need.94  
In relation to the protection of individuals the ECtHR exercises 
restraint. In Vereinigung Bildender Künstler v. Austria,95 the Court ruled 
a prohibition to display a painting that allegedly undermined the public 
standing of an individual to be in violation of Article 10 ECHR. The 
purpose of the injunction ordered by the Austrian Court was not to protect 
public morals but to protect the rights of an individual person, moreover 
for an unlimited period of time. Accordingly, restrictions to the right to 
artistic freedom have to be interpreted restrictively. 
Aside from the incentive provided by the grant of an exclusive right 
for intellectual creations, the use of existing works in the creation of new 
works is of fundamental importance. Although CJEU has recently 
rejected an external restriction of copyright by the right to free artistic 
expression,96 copyright includes mechanisms that enable derived 
creativity.97 The court specifically referred, on the basis of the InfoSoc 
Directive, to the exclusive rights of Article 2-4, the exceptions and 
limitations contained in Article 5(1)-(4) and the three-step test of Article 
5(5). In his YouTube Opinion, AG Saugmandsgaard Øe also warned that 
a general monitoring and filtering obligation would not only be contrary 
to Article 11 EUCFR, since it would restrict access to information, but it 
would also “introduce a risk of undermining online creativity and “that 
maximum protection of certain forms of intellectual creativity is to the 
detriment of other forms of creativity which are also positive for 
 
40287/98, para. 42. 
93 See more generally on this topic, Christophe Geiger, Freedom of Artistic Creativity 
and Copyright Law: A Compatible Combination, 8(3) UC Irvine Law Review (2018), 
413-458; Christophe Geiger, Copyright and the Freedom to Create, A Fragile Balance, 
38(6) International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 707 (2007); 
Christophe Geiger, When Freedom of Artistic Expression allows Creative 
Appropriations and Opens up Statutory Copyright Limitations, in: Shyamkrishna 
Balganesh, Ng-Loy Wee Loon, & Haochen Sun (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of 
Copyright Limitations and Exceptions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021) 
p. 174. 
94 ECtHR, (1988), para. 32. 
95 ECtHR (First Section), 25 January 2008, case of Vereinigung Bildender Künstler v. 
Austria, Appl. no. 68354/01, para. 31. 
96 See CJEU, C-476/17 Pelham and others, paras. 34-39. 
97 More generally the CJEU has argued with reference not only to artistic creation, that 
copyright, as harmonized at EU level, represent a fair balance between the various rights 
and interest affected, see CJEU, C-476/17 Pelham and others, paras. 59-62, CJEU, 
Judgment of 29.07.2019, Spiegel Online, Case C-516/17, EU:C:2019:625, paras. 43-46 
and CJEU, C-469/17 Funke Medien NRW, paras. 57-61. On these decisions see 
Christophe Geiger, & Elena Izyumenko, The Constitutionalization of Intellectual 
Property Law in the EU and the Funke Medien, Pelham and Spiegel Online Decisions 
of the CJEU: Progress, but Still Some Way to Go!, 51(3) International Review of 
Intellectual Property and Competition (2020), 282-306. 
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society.”98 In this regard the importance of the way art is communicated 
must be highlighted. In particular, modern forms of creative digital 
expression are predominantly disseminated to an audience via online 
platforms, such as those subject to regulation under Article 17 CDSM 
Directive.99 The regulation of dissemination channels can therefore 
constitute a restriction on the right to artistic freedom, which requires 
justification.100 
 
2. Freedom to conduct a business 
The freedom to conduct a business, together with the freedom to 
choose an occupation and to engage in work (Article 15) and the right to 
property (Article 17), is one of the three economic FR of the EUCFR. It 
serves to guarantee the freedom of entrepreneurs and reflects the EU’s 
principle of an open market economy with free competition.101 Its scope 
is broad and covers every economic activity and guarantees the right of a 
business to dispose freely of its resources of an economic, technical and 
financial character.102 Its scope also includes the right of an undertaking 
to choose with whom to enter into a contract, or in general, with whom to 
do business.103 
Due to its broad scope, the freedom to conduct a business is easily 
affected by national measures and regulatory interventions. Therefore, the 
proportionality analysis carries particular importance in the context of 
Article 16 EUCFR and is not barred by a positive finding that the essence 
of the respective fundamental right remains intact.104 
The Court of Justice has been largely supportive of commercial 
intermediaries and shielded them from excessive obligations. In Sabam v 
Netlog it argued that a “a complicated, costly, permanent computer 
system” solely at the expense of the intermediary constitutes a significant 
infringement of the FR of a hosting provider. The imposition of such a 
 
98 AG Saugmandsgaard Øe, C-683/18 YouTube, para. 243. 
99 Martin Senftleben, Bermuda Triangle—Licensing, Filtering and Privileging User-
Generated Content Under the New Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, 
available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3367219 (2019). 
100 Cf. Henrike Maier, Remixe auf Hosting-Plattformen: Eine urheberrechtliche 
Untersuchung filmischer Remixe zwischen grundrechtsrelevanten Schranken und 
Inhaltefiltern (Internet und Gesellschaft, Band 11), Mohr Siebeck, (Tübingen, 2018), p. 
175; see also Hans D. Jarass, Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union, 2020), 
Art. 13, para. 11. 
101 See Article 119(1) TFEU. 
102 CJEU, C-314/12 UPC Telekabel Wien, para. 49. On this relatively recent fundamental 
right and its relation to IP, see Gustavo Ghidini, & Andea Stazi, Freedom to conduct a 
business, competition and intellectual property, in: Christophe Geiger (ed.), Research 
Handbook on Human Rights and Intellectual Property, (Cheltenham, Northampton: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015), 410-420. 
103 CJEU, Judgment of 10.07.2013, Case C-426/11, EU:C:2013:521, para. 32 and CJEU, 
C-283/11 Sky Österreich, paras. 42-43. 
104 Cf. CJEU, C-283/11 Sky Österreich, paras. 46-68; here the CJEU examined whether 
the measure was proportionate after it had established that the essence of the freedom to 
conduct a business has not been affected. 
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system would not strike a fair balance between the property interests of 
rightholders and the business interest of a hosting provider.105 The 
ramifications of large-scale filtering on the economic viability of platform 
services was appreciated by AG Saugmandsgaard Øe in YouTube. 
Especially smaller platforms would encounter financial difficulties when 
fulfilling a broad obligation to keep infringing material off their 
services.106 
In other situations, the CJEU has been more lenient to allow 
restrictions of the freedom to conduct a business. In Sky Österreich, the 
CJEU examined a provision of Directive 2010/13 which obliged Member 
States to foresee in their national laws a rule under which broadcasters 
can gain access to broadcasts transmitted on an exclusive basis on a fair, 
reasonable and non-discriminatory manner in order to report on events of 
high interest to the public in the context of short news reports.107 In 
balancing Article 16 with Article 17 EUCFR, the Court found that the 
interference with the freedom to conduct a business by the obligation for 
broadcasters to make their exclusive broadcasts accessible was 
proportionate. The Court highlighted that the conditions under which 
access to exclusive broadcasts could be gained by other broadcasters were 
clearly determined and Article 15 AVMSD did not prevent rightholders 
from charging fees for such access, 108 thereby cushioning the effects of 
the restriction to the freedom to conduct a business. In this case, however 
the restrictions were clearly set out in the harmonizing legislation and the 
restrictions were relatively light. 
In two cases relating to access providers, the CJEU further determined 
the parameters for interferences with the freedom to conduct a business 
in the context of monitoring and blocking information. In Mc Fadden, it 
clarified that a requirement which obliged an access provider to 
marginally adjust the technical options available to him would not go as 
far as to encroach upon the very essence of the freedom to conduct a 
business.109 But in this case the measure requested seemed absolutely 
necessary to protect the essence of another fundamental right, which in 
turn justified a moderate restriction of the Article 16 right;110 however, an 
obligation to monitor internet traffic was clearly rejected in this case. In 
UPC Telekabel, the Court determined that a court injunction that ordered 
an access provider to block access to a specific website did not infringe 
the very substance of the fundamental right. Although the measure might 
represent a significant cost for the access provider, the fact that the choice 
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of which measure to implement to achieve a particular outcome was left 
to the service provider, taking account its capacities, weighed in favour 
of an appropriate balance.111 However, the Court also stressed that the 
access provider must be able to demonstrate before a court, in order to 
avoid liability, that it has taken all reasonable measures. This would 
safeguard compliance with the principle of legal certainty and give the 
access provider the opportunity to ensure full compliance with the 
injunction.112 In his Opinion in Mc Fadden, AG Szpunar argued that an 
injunction that leaves the choice of measures to be taken entirely to the 
intermediary could constitute a source of legal uncertainty, even if the 
appropriateness of such measures would be reviewable by the courts. An 
injunction formulated in general and vague terms would, therefore, not 
always succeed in striking a fair balance between the rights and interests 
involved.113 
Intermediaries must therefore be able to rely on sufficiently defined 
laws clearly set out what actions have to be taken to avoid liability. 
Similarly, overly cost-intensive measures are more likely to restrict 
Article 16 EUCFR to an extent that cannot be justified with reference to 
competing FR. The CJEU has permitted significant restrictions to the 
freedom to conduct a business only when strictly necessary and provided 
that the economic impact on the service provider is not disproportionate. 
This reflects a trend in the case-law of the CJEU that does not seem to 
support a position that would oblige platform operators to function as 
general private copyright enforcers. Also, with regard to the criteria set 
by the Court in UPC Telekabel, a provision setting obligations that would 
leave the intermediaries no other choice but to implement automated 
filtering systems to be effective would also likely be considered a 
disproportionate restriction to the freedom to conduct business. 
 
3. Data protection, privacy and family life 
The right to private life and the right to data protection are protected 
by Article 7 and 8 EUCFR respectively. Both Charter rights are based on 
Article 8 of the ECHR which protects the right to respect for private and 
family life.114 The right to data protection has further been given 
expression in secondary legislation by Regulation (EU) 2016/679 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal 
data and on the free movement of such data.115 Article 7 in particular also 
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paras. 116-124. 
114 Vedsted-Hansen, in: Peers, Hervey, Kenner, & Ward, 2014, Article 7, para. 07.03A. 
115 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 
2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data 
and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data 
Protection Regulation), OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 188 (GDPR), which replaced Directive 
95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data 
and on the free movement of such data (Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament 
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protects the right to respect for communications, which includes private 
and commercial communications.116 
The right to data protection can potentially enter into conflict with 
several other FR, especially within the context of secondary EU 
legislation.117 In relation to copyright the conflicts with the right to 
property and the right to an effective remedy are most pronounced. While 
the CJEU tends to avoid giving substantive guidance,118 the legislation 
itself is indicative of the balance between Article 7 and 8 EUCFR and 
Article 17(2) and Article 47.119 The large-scale analysis of information 
uploaded onto a hosting service has been ruled to be incompatible with 
Article 15(1) ECD, which prohibits Member States to oblige service 
providers to monitor information transmitted via, or stored on their 
service.120 To that effect, the CJEU underlined in Scarlet Extended that a 
general obligation to filter for infringing content would infringe the right 
to protection of personal data.121 This is because the automated filtering 
of information and its use to identify infringers will inevitably lead to the 
processing of personal data and would enable the identification of 
individual users.122 
The CJEU allows Member States a certain flexibility in designing 
their national laws to strike the balance between the right to property and 
the right to data protection. An illustration of the flexibility the Court 
affords to Member States are the Promusicae123 and Bonnier Audio124 
rulings of the CJEU. While in the former, the Court argued that EU law 
did not require that access providers must provide users data in civil 
proceedings, it considered national legislation that required the disclosure 
of user data in civil proceedings “likely, in principle” to strike a fair 
balance between the FR concerned.125 In L’Oréal v. eBay, the Court 
added, that in order to identify infringers on an online marketplace it must 
be possible to clearly identify infringers operating in the course of 
trade.126 However, in either situation, the interpretation and application of 
national law must ensure that a fair balance is struck and, in particular, 
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the right to privacy is respected.127 
The cases illustrate, however, the Court’s great caution to limit the 
rights of individual internet users too easily. In two cases it only permitted 
remedies that would infringe upon the rights of users because the right to 
property would otherwise have been impacted in its very core. This was 
the case in Mc Fadden, where the CJEU allowed a national court to order 
a small business to protect its wireless network with a password as one of 
only three options suggested by the national court to provide the 
rightholder with an effective remedy.128 In his Opinion in Mc Fadden, AG 
Szpunar rejected this option based on concerns for the protection of 
personal data.129 Similarly, in Bastei Lübbe, the Court allowed the 
identification of close relatives only because the rightholder would have 
been left without any other possibility to enforce his rights. It stated 
expressly that an absolute protection of the right to family life cannot be 
granted if this makes the enforcement of intellectual property rights 
impossible.130 Finally, with reference to the right to the protection of 
personal data, the Court applied a restrictive interpretation to the term 
‘address’ to exclude a user’s email address, telephone number and IP-
address.131 
The Courts positioning of the right to privacy and related FR display 
a high degree of restraint. A careful reading of the jurisprudence indicates 
that the rights under Article 7 and 8 EUCFR can only be limited to enable 
the enforcement of copyright under strict conditions, and often only when 
a restriction is necessary to preserve the essence of the right to property.132 
This leaves room for the assumption that the processing of data of 
individuals, and certainly its disclosure, constitutes restrictions to Articles 
7 and 8 EUCFR that are very difficult to justify. 
 
4. The right to property and its social function 
The right to property is guaranteed by Article 1, First Protocol to the 
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ECHR and Article 17(2) EUCFR. Whereas the former does not expressly 
mention intellectual property but guarantees the “peaceful enjoyment of 
(…) possessions”133, the latter simply states that “[i]ntellectual property 
shall be protected”. 134 However, under both FR regimes, the right to 
property can be limited. The ECHR foresees that “[n]o one shall be 
deprived of his possessions except in the public interest” and any 
interference with the right to property must be provided for by law.135 
Furthermore, states cannot be prevented from enforcing laws that control 
the use of property in the public interest. In more general terms, Article 
51 EUCFR states that “[a]ny limitation on the exercise of the rights and 
freedoms recognised by this Charter must be provided for by law and 
respect the essence of those rights and freedoms.” 
Accordingly, the right to property is not an absolute right and can be 
subject to restrictions.136 In YouTube, AG Saugmansgaard Øe stated that 
the exclusive right of communication to the public of Article 3(1) InfoSoc 
Directive “does not necessarily have to be interpreted in a manner which 
ensures maximum protection for rightholders.”137 In a similar vein, the 
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CJEU limited the scope of the related right of phonogram producers in 
Pelham by arguing that users, in exercising their FR to artistic expression, 
do not perform an act of reproduction in relation to a protected phonogram 
if the sample taken from that phonogram is unrecognizable to the ear once 
it has been integrated into a new work.138 What is protected is the essence 
of the right, and only a very serious infringement of the property right 
might possibly not strike a fair balance between the FR concerned. 139 
In its early case-law on the free movement of goods the CJEU has 
recognized the necessity to limit the exercise of intellectual property 
rights in order to ensure the functioning of the internal market. In 
Deutsche Grammophon, the Court established that the manufacturer of a 
phonogram could not rely on its right to distribution to prevent the sale in 
another Member State of copies of a phonogram which has been lawfully 
marketed in another Member State.140 It thereby rejected the possibility 
to justify a restriction to the free movement of goods on the ground of the 
protection of industrial and commercial property, which would only be 
possible in order to protect “right which constitute the essential subject-
matter of such property.”141 
According to the Court in Mc Fadden, measures to protect the right to 
property, e.g. by way of an injunction that would oblige an intermediary 
to terminate or prevent an infringement of copyright, must nevertheless 
be effective in preventing unauthorized access, or at least make access 
more difficult to access such content to the effect that users become 
discouraged.142 
In any case, the third sentence of article 17(1) CFREU provides that 
property can be limited in the general interest.143 Undoubtedly, this 
restriction also applies to intellectual property. Arguably, intellectual 
property, which is separately mentioned in paragraph 2 by a relatively 
blunt declaration, could be limited even further to give expression to its 
inherent social function.144  
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5. The right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial 
The right to an effective remedy and a fair trial is guaranteed by 
Article 47 EUCFR and Article 6(1) ECHR.145 Its scope is wide, and 
comes into play, in principle, whenever the Charter applies in order to 
guarantee the substantive rights and freedoms guaranteed therein.146 It 
also applies in disputes between individuals in relation to rights granted 
under EU law.147 In the context of platform liability, three aspects of 
Article 47 are of particular importance. First, the right to an effective 
remedy carries importance for rightholders who want to have recourse to 
redress mechanisms if their rights are infringed online. Second, users 
should have access to complaints and redress mechanisms in order to 
ensure the exercise of their rights. And third, both rightholders and users 
must have access to the possibility of having their claims reviewed by a 
competent judicial authority.148 
Users of platforms must be able to rely on their FR to freedom of 
expression and freedom of the arts to perform certain acts online. 
Automated enforcement by way of monitoring and filtering cannot only 
limit these rights, but a failure to make effective complaints mechanisms 
available can also restrict the right to an effective remedy. Therefore, as a 
first step, limitations to these rights, even if effected by private parties 
such as OCSSPs, must be subject to appropriate review.149 Appropriate in 
this context should mean, review by a competent court,150 as opposed to 
quasi adjudication by private operators.151 
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In substance, the right to an effective remedy requires that users can 
rely on a dispute settlement mechanism that provides them with an 
impartial forum which deals with their complaint efficiently and 
expeditiously.152 As much as preventive blocking of content restricts the 
right to freedom of expression, as much is a delay in reinstating lawful 
content harmful. This suggest that proceedings before national courts 
might not be the best option to effectively an expeditiously handle user 
complaints.153 However, such complaints should not necessarily be 
handled by OCSSPs, which will have their own, reasonably justified 
interests in designing automated enforcement as efficiently as possible. 
Users must have access to an impartial forum that provides them with a 
quick and impartial procedure.154 The CDSM Directive mandates out-of-
court dispute settlement mechanism for users redress and complaints.155 
Indeed, a properly designed alternative dispute resolution (ADR) 
infrastructure would be best placed to ensure user’s right to an effective 
remedy.156 
Member States are under an obligation to provide remedies to protect 
natural and legal persons against “any provision of a national legal system 
and any legislative, administrative or judicial practice which might impair 
the effectiveness” of EU law.157 Accordingly, in Mc Fadden, the Court 
ruled that rightholders must have access to a remedy to enforce their rights 
against potential infringers, but also by way of injunction to order an 
intermediary to terminate and prevent future infringements.158 This was 
further stressed in Bastei Lübbe, when the Court argued that the right to 
private life cannot be used to shield a family member from liability for 
copyright infringement if the rightholder would be left without an 
effective remedy, therefore robbing the right to property of its very 
 
Intellectual Property Law and Human Rights, (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law 
International, 2020), p. 729, with reference to Maayan Perel, & Niva Elkin-Koren, 
Accountability in Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement, 19(3) Stanford Technology Law 
Review (2016), 473-433 the author describes the paradigmatic shift from public law 
enforcement institutions to private law enforcement and adjudication powers exercised 
by a few privately operated platforms. 
152 Impartiality and independence of the court is another important feature of the right to 
fair trial (see Geiger, & Izyumenko, Intellectual Property before the European Court of 
Human Rights in: Geiger et al. (2018); Geiger, & Izyumenko, IIC (2014); Geiger, & 
Izyumenko, Intellectual Property before the European Court of Human Rights in: Geiger 
et al. (2018), p. 77). 
153 Cf. Frosio, & Geiger, SSRN (2020), p. 27. 
154 Cf. Frosio, & Geiger, SSRN (2020), p. 29. 
155 See Art. 17 (9) CSDM Directive, which reads as an attempt to codify the safeguards 
of fair trial and the right to effective remedy within the new online platform liability 
implemented by the Directive. 
156 See also the more extensive study by Frosio, & Geiger, SSRN (2020), who stress 
further that algorithmic enforcement itself must be designed to ensure respect for the 
right to an effective remedy and a fair trial. More specifically, and in addition to what is 
discussed in this section, a fair and balanced automated enforcement regime must be 
transparent and accountable, meaning that users have access to information why and 
based on what criteria their uploads have been filtered out (p. 28). 
157 CJEU, Judgement of 19.06.1990, The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex 
parte Factortame, Case C-213/89, EU:C:1990:257, para. 20. 
158 CJEU, C-484/14 Mc Fadden. 
37 
 
essence.159 In a balance between various FR, the right to an effective 
remedy cannot be entirely ignored. On the contrary, if necessary, other 
FR can be limited in order to ensure the proper enforcement of rights 
granted under EU law. As demonstrated above, the right to an effective 
remedy is not absolute and the cases in which the court argued in its 
favour were based on very specific fact patterns.160 
The right to an effective judicial remedy, therefore, has two important 
dimensions in relation to platform liability. One institutional, which 
should guarantee users and rightholder access to public law enforcement 
or at least impartial and independent adjudication authority, which can 
provide remedies to mitigate harm caused by third parties. And a 
procedural dimension, which should provide effectively and 
expeditiously for redress to compensate for harm caused and, more 
importantly, for injunctions that can prevent future harm from 
manifesting itself. 
 
 Legal Certainty and market harmonization 
The general principle of legal certainty and the structural aim of 
effective market harmonization have been considered by the CJEU in the 
context of the ‘fair balance’ of copyright.  
Legal certainty “requires that legal rules be clear and precise and aims 
to ensure that situations and legal relationships governed by Community 
law remain foreseeable”161 and “that Community rules enable those 
concerned to know precisely the extent of the obligations which are 
imposed on them”.162 The aim to establish an internal market is set out in 
Articles 3(3) TEU and 26 TFEU and given effect in the competence norm, 
of Article 114 TFEU. 
The CJEU discussed both principles in Pelham when it rejected the 
possibility to create exceptions or limitations beyond the list of Article 5 
InfoSoc Directive. It argued that the creation of new copyright rules solely 
based on FR would jeopardize the aim effective market harmonization, 
which pursues the objective of creating legal certainty.163 This 
demonstrates that the former is a function of the latter and should ensure 
that diverging national rules in the Member States of the EU do not 
constitute barriers to intra-community trade. 
The principle of legal certainty further mandates that rules are 
sufficiently clear and precise, a requirement which is not connected to the 
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aim of market harmonization. In this context, legal certainty requires that 
an economic actor can plan his actions in reliance on the law so as to avoid 
incurring liability. This was highlighted in UPC Telekabel when the Court 
argued that the addressee of an injunction must be able to foresee and 
ascertain, before incurring any penalty, whether he has taken all necessary 
measures to comply with his obligations.164 However, the Court did not 
exclude the possibility of an injunction that specifies an outcome but 
leaves the choice of specific measures to the addressee of an injunction.165 
 
 Interim conclusions 
The balancing of FR in relation to online copyright enforcement 
demonstrates a reluctance on part of the CJEU to give priority to property 
protection over other important FR. It becomes apparent that the legal 
framework that provides rightholders with enforcement tools needs to be 
respectful of the FR of others, restrictions to which must be always strictly 
scrutinized. Although the Court does not determine the balance to be 
struck with finality, it has provided guidelines with which domestic court 
have to apply national transpositions of the EU rules. With respect to the 
new liability mechanism for OCSSPs, which will be further described and 
analyzed below, it must be borne in mind that the right of users and 
platform operators, the right to privacy and freedom of expression, the 
right to due process and to an effective remedy, and the freedom to 
conduct a business respectively, have to be taken seriously and that any 
platform liability must be implemented in compliance with a fair balance 
of the rights involved166. No matter how legitimate the enforcement of 
exclusive rights protected by copyright law is in the online world, it 
cannot result in significant and disproportionate infringements of the 
rights of others and rightholders cannot expect to be treated more 
favorably than users and platform operators. Therefore, any liability 
regime for platforms must be designed in a FR-compliant manner and 
safeguards must be included to make FR a reality in its practical 
implementation. 
 
 EXAMINING ARTICLE 17 CDSM IN THE LIGHT OF FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS 
The new liability regime established by Article 17 CDSM creates 
significant FR overlaps. Before addressing these conflicts and assessing 
the balancing mechanisms offered by Article 17 it is instrumental to 
briefly examine its relevant provisions in more detail. 
 
 
164 CJEU, C-314/12 UPC Telekabel Wien, para. 54. 
165 CJEU, C-314/12 UPC Telekabel Wien. para. 52. 
166 See in this sense also Frosio, & Geiger, SSRN (2020). 
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 The new liability regime established by Art 17 CSDM – An 
overview 
Article 17 CDSM creates a new liability regime for OCSSPs.167 An 
OCSSP is “a provider of an information society service of which the main 
or one of the main purposes is to store and give the public access to a large 
amount of copyright-protected works or other protected subject matter 
uploaded by its users, which it organises and promotes for profit-making 
purposes.”168 
Article 17(1) provides that OCSSPs perform acts of communication 
to the public or making available when their users upload content 
protected by copyright.169 For these acts, they should obtain 
authorizations from rightholders. Such authorizations, e.g. by way of 
 
167 Recital 66 CDSM Directive, see also AG Saugmandsgaard Øe, C-683/18 YouTube, 
para. 252. 
168 Article 2(6) CDSM Directive. Recital 62 qualifies that the “Directive should target 
only online services that play an important role on the online content market by 
competing with other online content services, such as online audio and video streaming 
services, for the same audiences.” 
169 The nature of this norm is still unclear, whether it established a sui generis right of 
communication to the public, or whether it merely constitutes a clarification of the 
CJEU’s case law on Article 3(1) InfoSoc Directive (see on the CJEU’s extensive 
interpretation of Article 3 and its implications for hosting platforms: Bianca Hanuz, 
Direct Copyright Liability As Regulation Of Hosting Platforms For The Copyright-
Infringing Content Uploaded By Their Users: Quo Vadis ?, 11(3) Journal of Intellectual 
Property, Information Technology and E-Commerce Law (2020), 315-339) on. Article 
17(1), second sentence merely refers to Article 3(1) and (2) InfoSoc Directive to indicate 
which specific rights and rightholders are affected and does not establish that these two 
provisions are congruent in their scope. Recital 64, however, states that “[i]t is 
appropriate to clarify in this Directive that online content-sharing service providers 
perform an act of communication to the public or of making available to the public when 
they give the public access to copyright-protected works or other protected subject 
matter uploaded by their users.” Husovec and Quintais argue that Article 17(1) 
establishes a new right, with far-reaching implications also for the application of 
exceptions and limitations (Martin Husovec, & Joao Pedro Quintais, How to License 
Article 17? Exploring the Implementation Options for the New EU Rules on Content-
Sharing Platforms, available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3463011 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3463011 (2019), 1-27, pp. 5-10); see to the contrary: 
Nordemann, & Waiblinger, Art. 17 DSMCD: a class of its own? How to implement Art. 
17 into the existing national copyright acts, including a comment on the recent German 




1/?doing_wp_cron=1597142146.3135290145874023437500, accessed: 25.01.2021 and 
Nordemann, & Waiblinger, Art. 17 DSMCD: a class of its own? How to implement Art. 
17 into the existing national copyright acts, including a comment on the recent German 




2/?doing_wp_cron=1597144877.2035028934478759765625, accessed: 25.01.2021. 
See in this regard AG Saugmandsgaard Øe, C-683/18 YouTube, in which the AG seems 
to suggest that Article 17(1) defines by way of non-retroactive extension the right of 
communication to the public sector-specifically. 
40 
 
licenses, will cover acts of communication to the public performed by the 
users of OCSSPs.170 Accordingly, Article 17 derogates from the hosting 
safe harbour under Article 14(1) ECD with regard to OCSSPs.171 
Article 17(1) and (4) are systematically linked, whereby the former 
establishes primary liability for acts of communication to the public 
jointly committed by the OCSSP and its users, which morphs into 
secondary liability if the OCSSP has failed to obtain the necessary 
licenses.172 It is here that the conflicts between the various FR erupt most 
apparently. 
If OCSSPs do not, or are not able to, obtain an authorization, they are 
directly liable for unauthorized acts of communication to the public, 
including the making available to the public.173 However, OCSSPs can 
escape liability under two cumulative conditions: first, an OCSSP must 
demonstrate that it has undertaken “best efforts”174 to obtain 
authorization;175 second, it must have made “in accordance with high 
industry standards of professional diligence, best efforts to ensure the 
unavailability of specific works and other subject matter for which the 
rightholders have provided the service providers with the relevant and 
necessary information”.176 In any case, upon receiving sufficient 
substantiated notice from the rightholder, an OCSSPs must act 
expeditiously “to disable access to, or to remove from their websites, the 
notified works or other subject matter, and [make] best efforts to prevent 
their future uploads”.177 These new obligations constitute a fundamental 
shift in the EU’s approach to intermediary lability from ‘notice and take 
down’ to ‘notice and stay-down’.178 However, Art. 17(8) makes it very 
 
170 Article 17(2) CDSM Directive. 
171 Article 17(3) CDSM Directive: “When an online content-sharing service provider 
performs an act of communication to the public or an act of making available to the 
public under the conditions laid down in this Directive, the limitation of liability 
established in Article 14(1) of Directive 2000/31/EC shall not apply to the situations 
covered by this Article”. 
172 Leistner, SSRN (2020), p. 12. 
173 Article 17(4), first sentence CDSM Directive. 
174 Differences in the translation of the “best efforts” standards have been highlighted by 
Rosati, DSM Directive Series #5: Does the DSM Directive mean the same thing in all 
language versions? The case of ‘best efforts’ in Article 17(4)(a), available at: 
https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2019/05/dsm-directive-series-5-does-dsm.html, accessed: 
25.01.2021, for a comprehensive study on the linguistic variations of Article 17(4)(a) 
see Larroyed, When Translations Shape Legal Systems: How Misguided Translations 
Impact Users and Lead to Inaccurate Transposition – The Case of ‘Best Efforts’ Under 
Article 17 DCDSM, available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?, who warns 
that differences in national translations can seriously jeopardize the purpose of achieving 
harmonization. 
175 Article 17(4)(a) CDSM Directive. 
176 Article 17(4)(b) CDSM Directive. 
177 Article 17(4)(c) CDSM Directive. 
178 Reda et al. (2020), p. 8; Schwemer, & Schovsbo, What is Left of User Rights? – 
Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement and Free Speech in the Light of the Article 17 
Regime in: Torremans (2020), p. 586; Kuczerawy, From ‘Notice and Takedown’ to 
‘Notice and Stay Down’: Risks and Safeguards for Freedom of Expression in: Frosio 
(2020); see in general Niva Elkin-Koren, Fair Use by Design, 64(5) UCLA Law Review 
(2017), 1082-1100, p. 1093, who addressed the phenomenon that a shift to algorithmic 
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clear that these new obligations should not lead to duty for OCSSPs to 
install general filtering systems that would monitor all uploads in a 
general manner.179  
To determine whether OCSSPs comply with their obligations under 
Article 17(4), certain factors must be taken into consideration and be 
assessed in the light of the principle of proportionality. The relevant 
factors are “the type, the audience and the size of the service and the type 
of works or other subject matter uploaded by the users of the service”180 
and “the availability of suitable and effective means and their cost for 
service providers.”181 In addition, specific new OCSSPs do not incur all 
obligations under Article 17(4).182 
The interests of users of services that come within the scope of Article 
17 are reflected in Article 17(7) and (9). The former provides that the 
cooperation between rightholders and OCSSPs defined in Article 17(4) 
shall not prevent the availability of lawful content uploaded by users.183 
Paragraph 7 makes express reference to uses subject to exceptions and 
limitations, and further stipulates that exceptions for quotation, criticism 
and review as well as those for the purpose of caricature, parody or 
pastiche must be available for users to rely on. As for the use on online 
platforms that qualify as OCSSPs, these exceptions are mandatory.184 
The obligation for OCSSPs arising under Article 17(4) and the right 
of users expressed in Article 17(7) create an internal conflict within the 
systematic structure of Article 17.185 The resolution of practical conflicts 
 
enforcement has led to a shift in the balance in copyright. 
179 Article 17(8) CDSM Directive. 
180 Article 17(5)(a) CDSM Directive. 
181 Article 17(5)(b) CDSM Directive. 
182 New OCSSPs which are available to the public in the EU for less than three years and 
which have a turnover of less than EUR 10 million must only comply with Article 
17(4)(a) and are required to remove or disable access to infringing works or other subject 
matter upon notification (Article 17(4)(c), first sentence). Such OCSSPs with more than 
5 million visitors per year must also undertake best efforts to ensure the further 
unavailability of notified works and subject matter (Article 17(4)(c), second sentence). 
183 See very clearly in this sense, with references to the protection of the FR of the users, 
Recital 70 of the CDSM Directive. 
184 See Recital 70 of the CDSM Directive, stating that “those exceptions and limitations 
should (…) be made mandatory in order to ensure that users receive uniform protection 
across the Union”. On this issue see Quintais et al., JIPITEC (2019), pp. 278-279; 
Krzystof Garstka, Guiding the Blind Bloodhonds: How to Mitigate the Risks Article 17 
of Directive 2019/970 Poses to the Freedom on Expression, in: Paul Torremans (ed.), 
Intellectual Property Law and Human Rights, (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law 
International, 2020), 327-352, p. 335. Under the central norm that harmonized 
exceptions and limitation to the exclusive rights of copyright in the EU, all but one 
exception or limitation are options, see Article 5(2) and (3) InfoSoc Directive. 
185 See e.g. Pamela Samuelson, Pushing Back on Stricter Copyright ISP Liability Rules, 
Michigan Technology Law Review, Forthcoming, available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3630700 (2020), p. 14; the obligation to ensure that users can 
perform lawful uses is extremely difficult to realize considering the obligation to ensure 
that unlawful uploads must be prevented. The differentiation between lawful and 
unlawful uses, especially in cases of context-contingent uses under copyright exceptions, 
is impossible to make with automated means. See in this sense Christophe Geiger, The 
artificial intelligence and data-led revolution of copyright and its wider implications, 
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between these two provisions is anticipated in Article 17(9), which 
requires Member States to provide that OCSSP put in place effective and 
expeditious complaint and redress mechanisms which users can avail 
themselves of in case access to works uploaded by them is disabled or 
when they have been removed.186 OCSSPs must process user requests 
without undue delay and a decision to disable access or remove content 
must be subject to human review. Out-of-court redress mechanisms must 
also be made available, without depriving users of access to effective 
judicial remedies.187 Article 17(9) reiterates that the Directive should in 
no way affect legitimate uses, including such under exceptions and 
limitations and that personal data shall only be processed in accordance 
with Directive 2002/58/EC188 and Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR). 
While Article 17(7) is formulated as an absolute standard (“shall not 
result in the prevention of the availability of works or other subject matter 
uploaded by users“), Article 17(4) is based on a relative “best efforts” 
obligation.189 Furthermore, the Directive requires that OCSSPS inform 
users in their terms and conditions that they are permitted to use works or 
protected subject matter under exceptions and limitations. 
Finally, the Directive specifies that a stakeholder dialogue should 
explore best practices for the cooperation between OCSSPs and 
rightholders.190 
 
 Article 17, Automated filtering and fundamental rights 
Article 17 foresees that OCSSPS ensure the unavailability of certain 
works on their platforms without, however, indicating how this should be 
 
Digital Encounters, Final report p. 5, underlining the “unsolvable conflict” between Art 
17 (4) and 17 (8) CDSM, available at: 
https://www.fidefundacion.es/docs/GlobalDigitalEncounters/Encounter_8_Report_Fin
al.pdf 
186 According to Garstka, these procedures were put in place by the drafters of the 
directive “to mitigate the damage to Freedom of expression” created by Article 17 
CSDM Directive: Garstka, Guiding the Blind Bloodhonds: How to Mitigate the Risks 
Article 17 of Directive 2019/970 Poses to the Freedom of Expression in: Torremans 
(2020), p. 335. 
187 The provision again makes reference to exception and limitations, which users should 
be able to assert before a court of law, or another judicial authority. 
188 Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer 
programs, OJ L 122, 17.05.1991, p. 42-46 (Software Directive). 
189 This seems to establish a hierarchy between Art. 17(7) and 17(4), which was 
confirmed by the European Commission during the hearing before the CJEU in the 
context of the Polish challenge of Art. 17 (see Keller, CJEU hearing in the Polish 
challenge to Article 17: Not even the supporters of the provision agree on how it should 
work, available at: http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2020/11/11/cjeu-hearing-in-
the-polish-challenge-to-article-17-not-even-the-supporters-of-the-provision-agree-on-
how-it-should-work/, accessed: 25.01.2021). 
190 The stakeholder dialogue, which included not only representatives from OCSSPs and 
rightholders, but also users’ organizations fed into the drafting of guidelines on the 
application of Article 17. The mandate for the stakeholder dialogue underlined that 
account shall be taken of “the need to balance fundamental rights and of the use of 
exceptions and limitations” (Article 17(10) CDSM Directive). 
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achieved. When fulfilling their obligation OCSSPs must be careful not to 
restrict their users in lawfully sharing and accessing information. At the 
same time, platform operators should not be obliged to explore the limits 
of the economic viability of their business models to ensure that the rights 
of rightholders are effectively enforced. The balance between the 
different FR that are reflected in these interests is thus largely dependent 
on the technological solutions that OCSSPS will employ to discharge 
their obligations. 
 
1. Automated filtering as a necessary consequence of Article 17 
Article 17 requires that works or other subject matter for which 
rightholders have provided the relevant and necessary information should 
not be accessible. The provision must be read together with the obligation 
under Article 17(1) and the first condition to avoid liability under Article 
17(4)(a). Accordingly, OCSSPs must ensure the unavailability of content 
which is protected by copyright or related rights for which it has not or 
could not acquire a license. Rightholders must cooperate with OCSSPs 
by providing the relevant information in relation to such works, so that 
platform operators can comply with their obligations. How and to which 
extent this information is provided will have significant ramifications for 
the obligation to ensure unavailability of the works concerned.191 
To some extent, either preventively or as a reaction to prior 
infringements, OCSSPs will have to monitor and filter specific works 
automatically. Senftleben and Angelopuolos argue that Article 17 does not 
require OCSSPs to engage in automated monitoring of all content notified 
by rightholders.192 More targeted options, such as takedown-models 
including suspension of user accounts could be considered, among other 
 
191 The most likely scenario is that if rightholders, for various reasons, will not grant 
authorization for specific works or types of works OCSSPs would be provided with long 
lists of works and their respective data, see e.g. Gerald Spindler, The Liability system of 
Art. 17 DSMD and national implementation – contravening prohibition of general 
monitoring duties?, 10(3) Journal of Intellectual Property, Information Technology and 
E-Commerce Law (2019), 344-374, p. 356 and Reda et al. (2020), p. 15. In relation to 
these works OCSSPS would then have to ensure that any upload will be unsuccessful in 
order to comply with the condition of Article 17(4)(b) and (c). It should be qualified that 
the condition of Article 17(4)(c) only applies in cases in which content has been uploaded 
before and has been notified by the rightholder (cf. Senftleben, & Angelopoulos, SSRN 
(October 2020), p. 31). However, as we have seen, subparagraph (c) requires not only a 
takedown upon notification but, an obligation for the OCSSP to ensure the future 
unavailability (so-called “staydown”) of the notified content in accordance with the 
mechanisms of subparagraph (b). 
192 The authors recall three interpretations of what constitutes ‘general monitoring: (1) a 
basic interpretation which defines general monitoring as a situation in which all content 
of a platform is monitored, even if only in relation to specific works; (2) a situation in 
which monitoring of all content is permitted in relation to specific infringements 
pursuant to a court order, and (3) a situation in which monitoring of all content is 
permitted in relation to specific infringements pursuant to a court order notification by, 




options.193 The automated filtering of at least some content seems to be 
unavoidable for OCSSPs, even if in combination with other non-
automated mechanisms. 
 
2. Does automated filtering qualify as general monitoring? (Article 
17(8)) 
The Directive is very clear in this respect: The fulfilment of the ‘best 
efforts’ obligation arising under Article 17(4) shall not lead to a general 
monitoring obligation.194 As we have seen, a general obligation to 
monitor for information society service providers (ISSP) has been ruled 
out by the CJEU, most prominently in Scarlet Extended195 and Netlog.196 
The Court argued in both cases that such an obligation imposed on ISSPs 
by way of an injunction would conflict with various FR, including the 
right to receive or impart information, the right to protection of personal 
data and the freedom to conduct a business.197 
In L’Oréal v eBay, the CJEU stated that an intermediary cannot be 
expected to engage in “active monitoring of all the data of each of its 
customers in order to prevent any future infringement”. Such an 
obligation would be in violation of Article 15(1) ECD.198 Moreover, 
Article 3 of Directive on the enforcement of intellectual Property Rights 
(‘IPRED’)199 provides that “measures, procedures and remedies shall be 
fair and equitable and shall not be unnecessarily complicated or costly“. 
This in itself is an expression of a balance that is informed by 
proportionality. 
 
193 However, the suspension of user accounts, as only one example, must also be 
considered against the applicable FR, most notably the right to freedom of expression 
and artistic freedom, and therefore should be ultima ratio for repeat- or high volume-
infringers. 
194 Article 17(8) CDSM Directive. 
195 CJEU, C-70/10 Scarlet Extended. 
196 CJEU, C-360/10 SABAM v Netlog. 
197 A balancing of these rights of users of online services and the right of service 
providers against the right to intellectual property would not justify the imposition of a 
general filtering or monitoring obligation, see CJEU, C-70/10 Scarlet Extended, paras. 
41-54 and CJEU, C-360/10 SABAM v Netlog, paras. 39-52. 
198 Article 17(3) exempts the application of Article 14(1) ECD within the scope of Article 
17 CDSM, which means that the category of intermediaries that qualify as OCSSPS 
cannot rely on the liability exemption of the ECD. By reference to Article 14, Article 15 
of the ECD also becomes inapplicable to OCSSPs, however, Article 17(8) CDSM echoes 
the general monitoring prohibition of Article 15. And although Article 15(1) ECD is not 
applicable to OCSSPs because Article 17 CDSM constitutes a lex specialis regime for 
this specific type of intermediaries, by virtue of Article 17(8) such general obligation to 
monitor should not arise. There is nothing in the text of the Directive that suggests that 
Article 17(8) should be interpreted differently than Article 15(1) ECD, cf. Senftleben, & 
Angelopoulos, SSRN (October 2020), p. 26-27; cf. Leistner, SSRN (2020), p. 15, who 
also stresses that the notion of “general obligation to monitor” is a technical term which 
has to be interpreted in the light of the CJEU’s case-law. 
199 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 




In Mc Fadden, the CJEU ruled that “marginally adjusting one of the 
technical options open to the provider in exercising its activity” does not 
damage the essence of the freedom to conduct a business.200 The question 
in this case was whether and how the owner of a music store should 
restrict access to an open wireless network in order to prevent unlawful 
downloading of protected works in the future. The Court expressly 
rejected the option to monitor all the information transmitted via the 
internet access of the store owner as well as the complete termination of 
the internet connection. While the former option would have run counter 
the general monitoring prohibition of Article 15 ECD,201 the latter would 
have limited the owner in his exercise of his right under Article 16 
EUCFR.  
According to AG Szpunar, a lawful monitoring injunction ordered 
under Article 15(1) ECD is specific if it is “limited in terms of the subject 
and duration of the monitoring”.202 Senftleben and Angelopoulos require 
‘double-specificity’ in relation to infringed subject matter and 
infringer.203 An unlawful, and therefore ‘general’ obligation to monitor 
would therefore have to be more unspecific.204 In a similar vein, Leistner 
argues that obligations to monitor uploads in relation to specific 
infringing works, although the entirety of uploads to a platform operated 
by an OCSSP is subject to a matching exercise, are not of a general nature 
and therefore do not fall foul of Article 15(1) ECD or Article 17(8) 
CDSM.205 Specifically with regard to staydown duties he draws a parallel 
to the CJEU judgment in Glawischnig-Piesczek,206 in which the Court 
considered staydown obligations in relation to specific legal violations 
compatible with Article 15(1) ECD.207 
Following Leistner’s interpretation, the monitoring of specific 
infringements, albeit in relation to all uploaded content, would not 
constitute a general monitoring obligation. However, Article 17(4)(b) and 
(c) read in combination with Article 17(1) Article 17(4)(a) suggest that 
OCSSPs would be required to monitor uploads in relation to all works and 
other subject matter for which no authorization could be obtained by way 
 
200 CJEU, C-484/14 Mc Fadden, para. 91. 
201 CJEU, C-484/14 Mc Fadden, para. 87. 
202 AG Szpunar, C-484/14 Mc Fadden, para. 132; in this context the AG makes reference 
to the preparatory work for the ECD: see AG Jääskinen, Opinion of 09.12.2010, L’Oréal 
and Others, Case C-324/09, EU:C:2010:757, para. 182, the AG referred to a requirement 
of “double identity”, which requires that the infringer and the infringed subject matter is 
the same, which would require an intermediary to terminate or prevent infringements by 
the same user of a specific protected subject matter (e.g. a specific trademark). The AG 
considered the termination of a user account an appropriate means to achieve this result. 
203 Senftleben, & Angelopoulos, SSRN (October 2020), p. 2; this double-specificity 
requirement would arguably limit the effectiveness of the injunction as further 
infringements by other users, or the same users via different accounts, would not come 
within the scope of the specific monitoring obligation. 
204 Cf. Senftleben, & Angelopoulos, SSRN (October 2020), p. 24. 
205 Leistner, SSRN (2020), pp. 15-16. 
206 CJEU, Judgment of 03.10.2019, Glawischnig-Piesczek, Case C-18/18, 
EU:C:2019:821. 
207 Leistner, SSRN (2020), p. 16; See also Spindler, GRUR (2020), p. 258. 
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of agreement with the relevant rightholders. This does not mean, however, 
that all uploads in relation to content for which information is provided 
by rightholders constitute infringements. Copyright infringement can be 
equally nuanced as context-specific defamatory statements, which were 
at dispute in Glawischnig-Piesczek.208 Or the upload can constitute a fully 
legitimate use, because it is covered by an exception and limitation to 
copyright, an assessment that can in itself be a very complex one. 
Moreover, the constellation of actors and rights in relation to injuries to 
personality rights and copyright infringements cannot be considered to be 
equivalent.209 Therefore, in any constellation, it is imperative to 
reconsider OCSSP-obligations in the light of FR. 
For the meantime, it is sufficient to conclude that, in the case of 
Article 17, it seems difficult to imagine how OCSSPs can discharge their 
obligations differently than to install filtering and monitoring systems that 
would be considered general in nature.210 Although the way information 
is provided to OCSSPS might differ depending on the context, the 
obligation to ensure the unavailability of certain works will be most easily 
and effectively discharged by filtering content based on larger databases 
of metadata. As a result, the type of monitoring which will be required, or 
to which OCSSPs will be incentivized in order to escape liability will 
most likely amount to general monitoring and, as a result, to potential 
overblocking of legitimate uses.211 This is in particular the case since the 
technology itself has its limits. 
 
  A closer look at filtering: technological background 
Filtering technology, as it is described in the literature,212 is not as 
sophisticated to enable it to make complex decisions on the lawfulness or 
unlawfulness of uploads in an automated way.213 Automated filters bear 
the risk of creating “false positives”,214 i.e. identifying content as 
 
208 Cf. Aleksandra Kuczerawy, & Clara Rauchegger, Injunctions to remove illegal online 
content under the eCommerce Directive: Glawischnig-Piesczek, 57(5) Common Market 
Law Review (2020), 1495-1526, p. 1517, even a defamatory statement can be considered 
lawful if, by way of quotation, it is included into another news piece which critically 
reports on the context in which the defamatory statement was made. 
209 Cautioning against an analogy between defamation and copyright infringements 
based on Glawischnig-Pieszcek, Senftleben, & Angelopoulos, SSRN (October 2020), pp. 
14-15 and 29-30. 
210 Spindler, GRUR (2020), p. 259. 
211 Martin Senftleben, Institutionalized Algorithmic Enforcement – The Pros and Cons 
of the EU Approach to UGC Platform Liability, 14(2) Florida International University 
Law Review (2020), 299-328, p. 312, with further references. 
212 For a detailed overview of the various filtering technologies see Giovanni Sartor, & 
Andrea Loreggia, The Impact of algorithms for online content. “Upload Filters”. Study 
requested by the JURI Committee, (2020), p. 35 sq.  
213 Cf. Senftleben, & Angelopoulos, SSRN (October 2020), p. 13. For one of the most 
cited works in contemporary copyright literature that describes available filtering 
technologies see Engstrom, & Feamster, (2017); see further Reda et al. (2020), p. 27; 
Leistner, SSRN (2020), p. 5; Dusollier, C.M.L. Rev. (2020), p. 1018. 
214 Ben Depoorter, & Robert Kirk Walker, Copyright False Positives, 89(1) Notre Dame 
Law Review (2013), 319-359. 
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infringing although it is lawful. 
 
1. Limits of automated filtering technology (false positives) 
The discussion on the capability of Article 17 to fight copyright 
infringements and the role automated filtering should play in this context, 
is based on the misconception that technology is able to solve all 
enforcement problems. The EU legislator seems to assume that OCSSPS 
can employ ‘intelligent’ filters that identify infringing content while 
enabling the upload and making available of lawful content. 
However, filtering technologies are not developed as far as it would 
be necessary to fulfil the obligations under Article 17 completely with 
automated tools.215 None of the currently available filtering technologies 
are able to avoid so-called “false positives”, and when currently available 
technologies can identify similarities, they are unable to make the often-
complex assessment whether a similarity between two files amounts to 
copyright infringement.216 
 
a. Infringement threshold 
Qualitatively, automated tools that are only able to recognize full or 
partial matches between two or several files will not be able to assess 
whether a particular match, i.e. the full or partial identity between two 
files, amounts to a reproduction of either an authorial work, or a related 
right. For original works, the originality threshold is impossible to 
determine by merely finding certain similarities. Instead, the similarities 
must occur in relation to original parts of the underlying work, i.e. the 
parts copied must be part of an author’s own intellectual creation.217 For 
related rights, although the CJEU has established a relatively low 
threshold, a pure quantitative assessment is not sufficient to determine 
 
215 Thomas Spoerri, On Upload-Filters and other Competitive Advantages for Big Tech 
Companies under Article 17 of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, 
10(2) Journal of Intellectual Property, Information Technology and E-Commerce Law 
(2019), 173-186, p. 182, see also a study conducted in 2018 which stresses that 
YouTube’s ContentID cannot distinguish between unlawful uses and uses that do not 
require authorization: Sabine Jacques, Krzystof Garstka, Morten Hviid, & John Street, 
An Empirical Study of the Use of Automated Anti-Piracy Systems and Their 
Consequences for Cultural Diversity, 15(2) SCRIPTed (2018), 277-312, p. 287; 
reiterating this point Krokida, AG’s opinion on Peterson/ YouTube: Clarifying the 
liability of online intermediaries for the violation of copyright-protected works?, 
available at: http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2021/01/06/ags-opinion-on-
peterson-youtube-clarifying-the-liability-of-online-intermediaries-for-the-violation-of-
copyright-protected-works/, accessed: 25.01.2021. 
216 Engstrom, & Feamster, (2017), p. 64. See also in this sense, but in the context of the 
German implementation of the Directive, Albrecht Conrad and Georg Nolte, Die 
Schrankenbestimmungen im Anwendungsbereich des UrhDaG - Zu viele Rollen der 
Diensteanbieter beim urheberrechtlichen Interessenausgleich?, ZUM 2021 
(forthcoming). 
217 See only CJEU, Judgment of 19.07.2009, Infopaq I, Case C-5/08, EU:C:2009:465 
and CJEU, Judgment of 11.12.2011, Painer, Case C-145/10, EU:C:2011:798. 
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whether a particular file infringes a related right.218 
 
b. Contextual differentiation 
Moreover, automated filters, as described above, are unable to 
recognize contextual nuances, which is however necessary to distinguish 
prima facie infringements from uses that fall within the scope of an 
exception. Such distinction would be necessary to differentiate between a 
simple reproduction of a part of a work, and the reproduction of the same 
part for a use that is parodic or that constitutes a permitted quotation. Both 
exceptions must be assessed in the context the use of a protected work 
takes place and are based on contextual consideration such as humour or 
mockery219 and a dialogue between the original work and the work that 
quotes.220 Moreover, artistic creations or user generated content often 
includes creative reuses of existing protected works which also might, 
under certain conditions, benefit from an exception.221 
 
 Intermission: Effects of automated filtering on fundamental rights 
Considering the current state of technology, it is very likely that 
OCSSPs will have to resort to automated monitoring or filtering in order 
to comply with their obligations under Article 17(4) CDSM Directive.222 
Against this background, three main concerns arise in relation to 
automated filtering when examined through the lens of FR. 
First, fulfilling the “best efforts” obligation can significantly restrict 
the freedom to conduct a business. The specific impact will differ between 
OCSSPs and their relative economic capacities must be considered in 
relation to the harm caused to rightholders on the respective platform.223 
 
218 CJEU, C-476/17 Pelham and others, see the standard developed by the court, which 
requires whether a sample taken is “unrecognisable to the ear” (para. 31.). 
219 CJEU, C-201/13 Deckmyn, para. 20. 
220 CJEU, C-476/17 Pelham and others, paras. 71-73. 
221 See for example the case of sampling, for which the CJEU in principle left room for 
an application of the quotation exception of the sample is used in a dialogic manner 
(CJEU, C-476/17 Pelham and others, para 72), see also Bernd Justin Jütte, CJEU permits 
sampling of phonograms under a de minimis rule and the quotation exception, 14(11) 
Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice (2019), 827-829, p. 828. Other forms 
of arts borrow from protected works and have been considered as lawful because falling 
under the protection of freedom of artistic creativity (See Christophe Geiger, When 
Freedom of Artistic Expression allows Creative Appropriations and Opens up Statutory 
Copyright Limitations, in: Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Ng-Loy Wee Loon, & Haochen 
Sun (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Copyright Limitations and Exceptions, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021) p. 174). 
222 See supra 3.3.1.2. 
223 For example, it will surely be problematic for smaller OCSSPs who would have to 
acquire filtering software that complies with “high industry standards”, the cost of which 
could jeopardize the economic viability of their business models. See in general on the 
difficulty of smaller OCSSPs to gain access to sophisticated filtering technology see 
Spoerri, JIPITEC (2019), pp. 184-185; see in this sense Engstrom, & Feamster, (2017), 
p. 22-23, who conclude that “for smaller OSPs, the cost of these systems would make it 
significantly harder to attract investors and compete with dominant incumbents. In a 
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Second, users of platforms will be affected when they try to upload 
content which is filtered and blocked by automated mechanisms; users 
who access content via online sharing platforms will be restricted in their 
right to receive information. Third, the restriction of the right to receive 
and impart information must be balanced against the right of authors and 
other rightholders who have a vested interest to enforce their intellectual 
property rights. Without some form of enforcement, they could find 
themselves deprived of the essence of their rights.224 However, 
overenforcement, which would result in collateral overblocking of lawful 
uses, would in many cases be disproportionate to the protection provided 
to rightholders through automated filtering technologies necessitated by 
Article 17 CDSM. As we have already demonstrated, they will have 
detrimental effects on free speech and the exercise of user rights.225 
Whether these concerns can be mitigated with effective countermeasures 
will be decisive in assessing whether Article 17 unduly restricts the FR 
concerned. 
 
 Addressing fundamental rights in the mechanisms of Article 17 – a 
proper balance? 
The obligations for OCSSPs under Article 17(4) raise significant 
questions in relation to their compatibility with FR.226 Their specific 
scope is vague and dotted with terminology that requires specification 
(e.g. “best efforts”). Primarily, national transpositions will have to give 
concrete shape to this new and unclear specific liability regime, which in 
turn raises serious concerns that diverging transpositions will fail to 
achieve a harmonized legal framework.227 As we have seen, national 
transpositions must also consider the effects of EU FR on legislation that 
 
survey of investors in the U.S. and EU, a majority of respondents said they would be 
“uncomfortable investing in businesses that would be required by law to run a 
technological filter on user uploaded content.” 
224 CJEU, C-484/14 Mc Fadden, paras. 98-99. 
225 See also Depoorter, & Walker, Notre Dame L. Rev. (2013), p. 322. It must be 
highlighted here that, due to the technological limitations of filtering technologies, which 
will most likely be employed due to the relative expensiveness of other mechanisms (e.g. 
human review) or their lack of effectiveness (e.g. flagging), automated enforcement 
carries the risk to create disproportionately many ‘false positives’, i.e. takedowns of 
content which do not infringe or which is covered by an exception or imitation. The 
sheer amount of likely false positives constitutes non-negligible restrictions to the right 
to freedom of expression and the right to artistic freedom in particular when online 
platforms are used to disseminate musical and audio-visual artistic creativity (cf. AG 
Saugmandsgaard Øe, C-683/18 YouTube, para. 241). 
226 Cf. Senftleben, & Angelopoulos, SSRN (October 2020), p. 7. 
227 See for example Paul Keller, Divergence instead of guidance: the Article 17 
implementation discussion in 2020 – Part 1, available at: 
http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2021/01/21/divergence-instead-of-guidance-the-






implements EU secondary law. 
Adding to this uncertainty is the question of how to combine the 
obligations set by Art. 17(4) with Article 17(7), which sets a 
counterweight in the copyright balance by providing users of OCSSPs 
with a guarantee that the obligations for OCSSPs under Article 17(1) and 
17(4) should not prevent them from making lawful uses of works and 
other subject matter protected by copyright. 
In the following sections we will demonstrate that rightholders and 
OCSSPs alone, in cooperation with each other, and with the mere reliance 
on technology, are likely to fail in maintaining a balance between the 
various FR. We will highlight the most relevant rifts in FR protection 
under the most commonly discussed scenarios in various recent studies.  
 
1. Best efforts to obtain authorization (Article 17(4)(a)) 
The obligation to obtain authorization consists of two components: to 
assess whether contents on their services require licenses and to obtain 
authorization for the use of that content.228 Leistner argues that the 
systematic structure of Article 17(4) suggests that OCSSPs incur an 
obligation to investigate actively infringing content and undertake best 
efforts to obtain licenses for the relevant works and subject matter.229 In 
any case, OCSSPs cannot remain passive and refrain from actively 
engaging with rightholders to obtain the required authorizations.230 
Considering that the efforts that must be undertaken have to be 
proportionate, Leistner argues further that OCSSPs cannot be expected to 
enter into licensing agreements with all rightholders, including smaller 
artists.231 An obligation to identify all infringing works, even if, as 
 
228 Spindler, GRUR (2020), p. 255. 
229 Cf. Leistner, SSRN (2020), p. 23. 
230 It must also be considered, when assessing the best efforts undertaken by OCSSPs, 
that identifying the rightholders in relation to content uploaded by users can itself pose 
a significant challenge. 
231 Leistner, SSRN (2020), p. 24, the information and transactions cost arising from such 
an obligation would be immense and would require OCSSPs to invest significantly in 
their licensing efforts. Leistner argues that it would suffice if platform operators enter 
into agreements with major rightholders and collecting societies. See to that effect also 
Article 12 CDSM Directive, which enables extended collective licensing. This, 
admittedly, would be problematic as smaller artists, which are most of the time the most 
in need for better licensing revenues, would be discriminated against. Spindler on the 
contrary proposes that smaller rightholders could instead be offered to monetize their 
rights. He argues that although OCSSPs cannot be required to conclude licenses with all 
rightholder, a positive obligation exists for platform operators to identify rightholders 
whose works are infringed on their platforms. He argues further that even proportionality 
would not limit this obligation to random checks for infringing content, (Spindler, GRUR 
(2020), p. 255). Given the sheer amount of potentially infringing content on larger 
platforms, but also the economic means required to conduct such searches, this 
interpretation might be difficult to put into practice. A proactive search and verification 
obligation in relation to potentially all uploads would pose significant problems with 
respect to Article 16 EUCFR as it would amount to a general monitoring. In any case, 
the practical difficulties in concluding licenses with righholders of content uploaded by 
others cannot lead to discrimination to the detriment of smaller right holders. 
51 
 
Spindler argues, the systematic structure of Article 17 seems to suggest 
this, would place a disproportionately high burden on platform 
operators.232 Moreover, the European Copyright Society argues that this 
requirement would effectively amount to a general monitoring 
obligation.233 
Once an OCSSP has entered into negotiations with a rightholder or, 
more likely, with a group of rightholders or their representative (e.g. a 
collecting society), the platform operator cannot be expected to accept 
every offer.234 The amount due for a license to use specific works and 
subject matter must be proportionate in relation to the size of the platform 
and the number of its users.235 In this sense, the notion of ‘best efforts’ 
has a very concrete financial dimension. It must be possible for an OCSSP 
to reject an unreasonable license offer236 while still complying with the 
requirement under Article 17(4)(a). An obligation to contract at a price 
determined by rightholders would significantly restrict the freedom to 
conduct a business by limiting the economic choices of platform 
operators.237 Effectively, an obligation to contract cannot be derived from 
Article 17(4).238 However, OCSSPs can be expected to enter into genuine 
negotiations in good faith in order to enable the lawful use of relevant 
works or other subject matter.239 
 
2. Targeted and tailored filtering obligations 
Having made best efforts, unsuccessfully, to obtain authorizations for 
works and other subject matter protected by copyright, OCSSPs incur the 
two cumulative obligations to prevent uploads of unauthorized works, to 
remove upon notice unauthorized works and prevent their future uploads. 
We have demonstrated above that any obligation arising under Article 
17(4)(b) and (c) cannot amount to a general monitoring obligation.240 
Therefore, any obligation to remove or block access to content must 
be strictly targeted and tailored. The CJEU has recently ruled in 
Glawischnig-Piesczek that a hosting platform cannot be burdened with 
excessive obligations, more specifically it cannot be expected that hosting 
 
232 Spindler, GRUR (2020), p. 255. 
233 The European Copyright Society (2020), p. 119, the drafters of the opinion argue 
further that OCSSPs can be expected to proactively contact larger rightholders and 
would only act reactively upon notification by smaller and independent rightholders. 
234 See Leistner, SSRN (2020), p. 24, who argues convincingly that at least all available 
collective licenses should be obtained. 
235 See to that effect Spindler, GRUR (2020), p. 255: if the fees demanded by the 
rightholders are unreasonably high, an OCSSP cannot be expected to enter into an 
agreement. 
236 Spindler, JIPITEC (2019), pp. 348-349. 
237 Spindler, GRUR (2020), p. 255. Similarly, an operator of a hosting platform must also 
be permitted to refuse to conclude a license in the first place. The obligation to 
demonstrate best efforts cannot result in an obligation to contract. This would effectively 
enable rightholders to set the financial conditions under which OCSSPs have to operate. 
238 Cf. Spindler, GRUR (2020), p. 255. 
239 Cf. The European Copyright Society (2020), p. 119. 
240 See supra 3.2. 
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platforms actively seek information on infringing or generally illegal 
activity, or conduct an independent assessment of the illegality of acts.241 
In UPC Telekabel, the Court argued that an intermediary can be required 
to take certain measures that necessitate the use of economic resources. 
However, the intermediary must only take reasonable measures and not 
make “unbearable sacrifices”.242 Moreover the intermediary must be able 
to anticipate and, if necessary, verify, in the light of the principle of legal 
certainty, whether the measures taken are sufficient to comply with the 
requirements of Article 17(4)(b) and (c).243 
A targeted filtering obligation must also ensure that the collateral 
effects of such a measure are kept at a minimum.244 In exercising their 
respective right to freedom of expression, including the right to receive 
information, users who post and access content on a platform must be able 
to perform lawful acts. A broad filtering mechanism which would result 
in overblocking of lawful content would most certainly restrict the right 
to freedom of expression in a way which would be difficult to justify in 
this specific constellation. 
Therefore, any measure that OCSSPs take to fulfil the conditions 
under Article 17(4)(b) must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve 
the purpose of that condition, which is to protect the economic rights of 
rightholders. Several elements must be considered in order to define the 
scope of these obligation. First, Article 17(4)(b) refers to “specific works 
and other subject matter”. These are the types of content in relation to 
which OCSSPs incur an obligation to, second, “ensure [their] 
unavailability”. Third, OCSSPs are only required to ensure the 
unavailability of the specific works or subject matter if rightholders have 
provided them with “relevant and necessary information.” 
 
a. Prevent access to specific works and subject matter (Article 
17(4)(b)) 
It is necessary to distinguish the obligations arising under Article 
17(4)(b) and (c). Whereas under subparagraph (c), obligations similar, but 
not identical, to those in L’Oréal v eBay arise (i.e. the removal of notified 
 
241 CJEU, C-18/18 Glawischnig-Piesczek, para. 46. 
242 The Court makes one specific qualification that could differentiate the situation in 
UPC Telekabel from that arising under Article 17. In para. 53 it states: “That possibility 
of exoneration clearly has the effect that the addressee of the injunction will not be 
required to make unbearable sacrifices, which seems justified in particular in the light of 
the fact that he is not the author of the infringement of the fundamental right of 
intellectual property which has led to the adoption of the injunction.” One could argue 
that the extension of the communication to the public right under Article 17(1) would 
change this assessment because OCSSPs become legally responsible for acts committed 
by their users. Nevertheless, this constitutes a legal fiction and the actual act that causes 
the infringement is performed not by the platform operator but by a third party, Therefore 
the reasoning in UPC Telekabel should also be applicable for the liability exemption 
under Article 17(4) CDSM Directive.  
243 Cf. CJEU, C-314/12 UPC Telekabel Wien, para. 54. 
244 Cf. Reda et al. (2020), p. 28. 
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content), obligations under subparagraph (b) are different and go further. 
This can be explained from the systematic structure of Article 17(4).245 
The monitoring of content in order to ensure the unavailability of 
specific works requires that specific works are identified. This requires 
direct cooperation between rightholders and OCSSPs.246 That cooperation 
cannot, however, result in the advance flagging of large repertoires of 
music and audio-visual material without any indication of prior 
infringement or at least the likelihood of future infringements.247 Such an 
arrangement would move the process that results in decision to block and 
filter – in itself a stark restriction of Article 11 EUCFR – outside the reach 
of users and constitute a significant restriction to the right to an effective 
remedy. How, then, can rightholders and OCSSPs find ways to stay 
within the permitted scope of ‘specific’ and ‘targeted’ monitoring 
mechanisms to ensure that certain works and subject matter are made 
unavailable? 
The two extremes of filtering are illustrated by SABAM v Netlog (for 
hosting providers in relation to copyright) and by Glawischnig-Piesczek 
(for hosting providers in relation to personality rights). While in SABAM 
v Netlog, the CJEU found an obligation to filter indiscriminately not to be 
in compliance with the obligations arising under the ECD,248 it found in 
Glawischnig-Piesczek that an injunction that targets specific content 
uploaded by specific users would not constitute a general filtering 
obligation.249 The AG in the latter case even extended the personal scope 
of such an obligation to all users of a service, as long as the specificity of 
the subject matter limits the scope of an injunction.250 And here lies the 
main distinction that justifies a relatively broad filtering obligation, 
because the subject matter that must be monitored and filtered is not only 
specifically defined, but it is also determined by a court which issues an 
injunction before a platform operator commences with monitoring and 
 
245 Cf. Senftleben, & Angelopoulos, SSRN (October 2020), p. 31. 
246 Article 17(7) in its relevant part reads: “The cooperation between online content-
sharing service providers and shall not result in the prevention of the availability of 
works or other subject matter uploaded by users, which do not infringe copyright and 
related rights, including where such works or other subject matter are covered by an 
exception or limitation.” 
247 This type of cooperation would certainly lead to a monitoring obligation which is 
more on the ‘general’ side of the spectrum, rather than of a ‘specific’ nature. 
248 CJEU, C-360/10 SABAM v Netlog, the Court ruled that EU law precludes a filtering 
obligation that obliges a hosting provider to install a mechanism that applies to 
information which is stored on its servers by its service users, which applies 
indiscriminately to all of those users, as a preventative measure, exclusively at its 
expense, and for an unlimited period. 
249 CJEU, C-18/18 Glawischnig-Piesczek, para. 35; See Kuczerawy, & Rauchegger, 
C.M.L. Rev. (2020), p. 1499: the authors criticize that the CJEU did not consider 
sufficiently the impact of such an injunction of the rights of users, who will be affected 
even by a specific filtering mechanism (p. 1524). 
250 AG Szpunar, Opinion of 04.96.2019, Glawischnig-Piesczek, Case C-18/18, 
EU:C:2019:458, para. 59; it is worth noting that due to the type of injunction sought in 




In particular in relation to copyright infringements, the necessity to 
take down and remove infringing works or other subject matter 
expeditiously is not comparable to the necessity that arises in relation to 
other content.252 It would, therefore, be more proportionate to limit the 
portfolio of works and other subject matter the upload of which can be 
prevented to such works specifically identified as infringing. 253 
Automated filtering would then apply only to uploads which are 
manifestly illegal.254 
A study by the Gesellschaft für Freiheitsrechte departs from the 
assumption that the obligation to ensure the unavailability of specific 
works or subject matter can only be guaranteed by the employment of 
automated filters.255 These filters, however, cannot discern context.256 But 
only if a distinction between lawful and unlawful context can be made, 
can a proper balance between the various interests and FR be achieved.257 
 
251 The relevant passage reads: “(…) it is important that the equivalent information 
referred to in paragraph 41 above contains specific elements which are properly 
identified in the injunction, such as the name of the person concerned by the 
infringement determined previously, the circumstances in which that infringement was 
determined and equivalent content to that which was declared to be illegal. Differences 
in the wording of that equivalent content, compared with the content which was declared 
to be illegal, must not, in any event, be such as to require the host provider concerned to 
carry out an independent assessment of that content.” CJEU, C-18/18 Glawischnig-
Piesczek, para. 45. However, even a complete congruence of an upload with a protected 
work can still be lawful if it falls within the scope of an exception. Most of such matches 
would require an independent assessment, but per Glawischnig-Piesczek this assessment 
cannot be imposed on online platforms. 
252 E.g. child pornography and terrorist content, cf. European Parliament, European 
Parliament resolution of 20 October 2020 on the Digital Services Act and fundamental 
right issues posed (2020/2022(INI)), P9_TA(2020)0274, EP, 20.10.2020, paras. 11-13, 
at para. 13 the European Parliament stresses that in relation to illegal content online, 
intermediaries should not be obliged to install automated tool to moderate content. 
253 For example, because they have been already recognized as copyright infringement 
by a court. In this case, it seems totally appropriate that a content what has been taken 
down as a result as court decision should be not be uploaded again and upload filters 
could prevent that. 
254 See e.g. Frosio, & Geiger, SSRN (2020), p. 37, see also Maxime Lambrecht, Free 
Speech by Design. Algorithmic protection of exceptions and limitations in the Copyright 
DSM directive, 11(1) Journal of Intellectual Property, Information Technology and E-
Commerce Law (2020), 68-94, p. 89; Quintais et al., JIPITEC (2019), see also a letter 
sent to Commissioner Breton on 14.09.2020 by 27 civil society and users’ organizations, 
available at https://www.euractiv.com/wp-
content/uploads/sites/2/2020/09/Civil_society_letter_Art17_consultation.pdf, accessed 
on 25.01.2021. Lambrecht relates such a criterion to the Glawischnig-Piesczek standard, 
which would oblige OCSSPs to prevent imminent harms, i.e. uploads which are only 
imminent harms and should not extend to potentially harmful uploads, the verification 
of which would require OCSSPs to conduct further investigations, Lambrecht, JIPITEC 
(2020), pp. 89-90, the author further explains that rightholders would not be left without 
protection but could resort to the ‘traditional’ mechanisms of takedown requests or court 
injunctions. 
255 Reda et al. (2020), p. 25. 
256 Reda et al. (2020), p. 26, see also P9_TA(2020)0274, para. 12.  
257 The collateral effect of employing filtering technology is that the rights of users will 
be significantly restricted, which can lead to a chilling effect. As a result of overblocking 
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In order to ensure legal certainty and to preserve some of the very essence 
of the right to intellectual property of rightholders whose works and 
subject matter are shared on online platforms, merely relying on user-self-
declaration258 would be insufficient.259 
The notion of “best efforts” implies that not all infringing content has 
to be made unavailable. Here exists ample room for consideration based 
on FR in designing the combination of technological or human tools used 
to ensure obligations arising under Article 17(4) can be fulfilled.260 This 
leaves the question of how, in maintaining a proper balance, to identify 
the works that can be subject to removal and, to a specifically defined 
extent, be filtered.  
A combination of measures including human intervention, both by 
users and OCSSPs, and some sort of automated filtering significantly 
increases the burden on platform operators. In essence, general 
monitoring that results in overblocking is most likely the most cost-
effective mechanism that would least restrict OCSSPs freedom to conduct 
a business and help them to avoid primary liability.261 The restrictive 
effects on the rights of users would be significant and such restrictions 
could certainly not be justified. A solution that creates a fair balance at 




and user frustration through repeated unsuccessful upload, albeit of lawful content, users 
can be incentivized to switch platforms or cease using them altogether. Highlighting the 
risk of overblocking- “that is removing access to more than one wishes to, or more than 
the law requires”- see Garstka, Guiding the Blind Bloodhonds: How to Mitigate the 
Risks Article 17 of Directive 2019/970 Poses to the Freedom of Expression in: 
Torremans (2020), p. 332. 
258 Also suggested as an intermediary step, see Quintais et al., JIPITEC (2019), p. 280. 
259 This is not to say that user self-declarations should not be part of the combination of 
measure that will also serve to guarantee the rights of users. In this way, platform users 
can be reasonably included in the cooperation between rightholders and platform 
operators to create a just and fair balance of interests. 
260 Senftleben and Angelopoulos suggest other, albeit not equally effective options, that 
could be installed in lieu of filtering technology. Such alternatives could include the co-
option of users to flag infringing content, pop-up banners that inform users that 
uploading infringing content is prohibited and contractual regulation and information 
through terms and conditions, Senftleben, & Angelopoulos, SSRN (October 2020), p. 23; 
the authors make reference to the original draft of what became Article 17 CDSM 
Directive, which expressly referred to content recognition technologies as measures to 
fulfil the preventive obligation under Article 17(4)(b). Whether this omission in the final 
version means the principled exclusion of such technological tools while the provision 
refers to “high industry standards of professional diligence” (see also recital 66) or 
merely tries to hide the facts that some sort of technological filtering in necessary cannot 
be determined with certainty. However, recital 66 also states that in assessing whether 
the high industry standards of professional diligence have been complied with it is 
necessary to consider, also in the light of the principle of proportionality “the evolving 
state of the art as regards existing means, including potential future developments, to 
avoid the availability of different types of content and the cost of such means for the 
services.” 
261 Cf. Spoerri, JIPITEC (2019), p. 183. 
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b. Disable access upon notification 
The requirement to disable access upon notification pursuant to 
Article 17(4)(c) seems unproblematic at first look. In accordance with the 
wording of the provisions, OCSSPs can only be expected to remove 
infringing content when the rightholders provide “sufficiently 
substantiated notice”. All major user-generated content platforms already 
foresee mechanisms by which content can be flagged for copyright 
infringement.262 
The requirement to provide “sufficiently substantiated notice” reflects 
FR concerns over excessive content flagging. OCSSPs should only be 
required to remove content if it is likely that the uploaded material indeed 
infringes copyright.263 The obligation to remove content becomes 
problematic, from a FR perspective, when it is combined with the 
obligation to prevent future uploads of works or other subject matter that 
have been removed after an OCSSP has been notified. 
 
c. Best efforts to ensure future unavailability of specific works (Article 
17(4)(c)) 
The obligation that arises under Article 17(4)(c) requires OCSSPs to 
monitor and ensure the unavailability protected subject matter the future, 
which is in temporal relationship to the moment in which an infringing 
work has been notified. The speech-restrictive effect of a cumulation of 
filtering requirements would also grow increasingly the more 
rightsholders notify infringing works, morphing eventually into a general 
monitoring and filtering obligation.264 In this context, the notion of ‘best 
efforts’ must be interpreted in the same way as under Article 17(4)(b). 
Therefore, considered in the light of FR, the obligation to prevent 
future uploads after rightholders have given notice of infringing content 
must be subject to reasonable restrictions in terms of time and subject 
matter. First, the future unavailability cannot be extended ad infinitum in 
order to enable uses, in particular lawful uses, at a later point. Second, the 
obligation to prevent uploads must also be targeted. 
The obligations for OCSSPs can therefore not extend to an obligation 
that would require such platforms to take measures that would effectively 
have the same effects on the exercise on FR as a general filtering 
obligation. As automated filters cannot assess copyright infringements 
beyond the first step, i.e to determine whether a prima facie infringement 
has occurred,265 OCSSPs must employ other means to distinguish 
 
262 This approach is expressly foreseen in Article 14 ECD. 
263 See supra 3.5.2.1, i.e. that the content is identical or manifestly infringing, however 
in relation to notifications for takedowns, in order to ensure the rights of users, the 
takedown and subsequent staydown should only be effected after a procedure that 
safeguard the right to an effective remedy, including the right to be heard for users. 
264 Cf. Senftleben, & Angelopoulos, SSRN (October 2020), p. 3. 
265 Even prima facie infringements are difficult to determine with certainty, due to the 
qualitative nature of the originality requirement; see in general Reda et al. (2020), p. 27. 
Particularly in relation to related rights, in which the CJEU has introduced a subjective 
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infringing uploads from uploads that are lawful. A contextual analysis, 
and more importantly an expeditious analysis of uploads, that cannot be 
assessed automatically will require the investment of significant resources 
initially, but also at the stage of user complaints. 
It is important here to restate the complex implications of moderating 
user complaints that OCSSPs would have to navigate that would, it is 
argued here, result in significant restrictions of freedom of expression and 
also create disproportionate burdens for platforms. First the lack of 
substantive harmonization of copyright exceptions and limitations creates 
very high information costs.266 As a result, the same uploaded content can 
be infringing in one Member States, while fully lawful in another. 
Additionally, problematic in this constellation is that these decisions that 
potentially restrict freedom of expression would have to be made by 
private actors, which are charged with safeguarding the rights of users and 
rightholders, which are themselves difficult to reconcile.267 Instead, the 
decisions to maintain or to remove notified content must be made by a 
neutral intermediary which is not biased by its own economic 
preferences.268 
 
d. Proportionality as a horizontal requirement (Article 17(5)) 
Article 17(5) makes express reference to the proportionality principle. 
In assessing whether an OCSSP has complied with its obligations arising 
under paragraph 4, the specific characteristics of the service provider have 
to be taken into consideration (a) as well as the availability of suitable and 
effective means and their cost for the service provider (b). Also, the type 
of works and other subject matter uploaded by the user needs to be 
considered, which if interpreted in a freedom of expression and 
information-compliant manner might lead to a differentiation between 
uploads of works that carry important societal information of political, 
 
element into the infringement test, automates filters that are fine-tunes to identify 
marginal similarities, will create a large number of false positives. 
266 See in general Lucie M.C.R. Guibault, Why Cherry-Picking Never Leads to 
Harmonisation: The Case of the Limitations on Copyright under Directive 2001/29/EC, 
1(1) Journal of Intellectual Property, Information Technology and E-Commerce Law 
(2010), 55-66; Christophe Geiger & Franciska Schönherr, Defining the Scope of 
Protection of Copyright in the EU: The Need to Reconsider the Acquis regarding 
Limitations and Exceptions, in: Tatiana-Eleni Synodinou (ed.), Codification of European 
Copyright Law. Challenges and Perspectives, (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law 
International, 2012), 133-167. See further recital 5 CDSM Directive. See also in this 
sense, Christophe Geiger and Franciska Schönherr, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) 
of Consumers in relation to Copyright, Summary Report (EUIPO 2017) 
<https://euipo.europa.eu/ohimportal/web/observatory/observatory-publications> 
(listing exceptions and limitations to copyright as one of the areas of major divergence 
in national copyright law). 
267 In assessing whether an OCSSP has complied with the ‘best efforts’ standard it is not 
only necessary to consider the economic impact of such an obligation on the individual 
OCSSP, but also, and probably more importantly, the effects on the availability of lawful 
content. In the end, OCSSPs should not be able to demonstrate best efforts with the result 
that users are significantly hindered in their exercise of their Article 11 and 16 rights. 
268 See more detailed infra 3.6. 
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scientific or artistic nature and other uploads. The former will need to be 
appreciated with specific care. The appreciation of the compliance with 
Art. 17 (4) will be made on a case-by-case basis, as the list of elements to 
be taken into account is non-limitative.269  
The choice of factors suggests, also in combination with the 
exceptions under Article 17(6), that smaller and economically less potent 
OCSSPs will not be measured in the same way as larger OCSSPs would. 
In general, the proportionality principle should ensure that OCSSPs do 
not incur too high a burden and that rightholders must also contribute to 
the enforcement of their rights.270 And although it does not become 
apparent from the wording of Article 17(5), recital 66 also makes 
reference to the purpose limitation of the measure that have to be 
implemented pursuant to Article 17(4), which should “not go beyond 
what is necessary to achieve the objective of avoiding and discontinuing 
the availability of unauthorised works and other subject matter.” 
Accordingly, the design of the measures must consider the interest of 
smaller platforms but also users as part of a wider proportionality 
analysis. 
 
3. Safeguarding fundamental user rights (Article 17(7)) 
Against a potentially overreaching enforcement regime based on 
Article 17(4), Article 17(7) provides that Member States must foresee 
safeguards for the exercise of lawful uses by users of online content-
sharing platform.271 Furthermore, Article 17(7), second sentence provides 
that users must be able to rely on specific exceptions when uploading and 
making available works and other subject matter on online content-
sharing services. The exceptions are those for quotation, criticism, review, 
and use for the purpose of caricature, parody or pastiche. 
 
a. The primary obligation to guarantee lawful uses 
Article 17(7) states that the “cooperation between online content-
sharing service providers and rightholders shall not result in the 
prevention of the availability of works or other subject matter uploaded 
by users”.272 In the light of the right to freedom of expression and artistic 
freedom, this formulation should be read to the effect that initial (read: 
preventive) filtering of content should not lead to the unavailability of 
works the upload of which is lawful or non-infringing.273  
 
269 This is confirmed by the wording of Article 17(5) which specifies that “the following 
elements, among others, shall be taken into account” (emphasis added) when assessing 
whether the obligations of Article 17 (4) are met. 
270 In this regard recital 66 CDSM Directive considers Article 17(4)(c) as an expression 
of proportionality. 
271 The provision refers expressly to non-infringing uses, including uses covered by an 
exception or limitation. 
272 Emphasis added. 
273 Uploaded works, the rights of which are not owned by the uploader, can be non-
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Preventing such uploads initially, because they have been caught by 
an upload filter, would constitute a form of censorship. Such a restriction 
of the rights under Articles 11 and 13 EUCFR is generally not justified, 
even if the possibility of review could eventually lead to the availability 
of the work or other subject matter at a later point. The preventive 
blocking of an entire website without any prior legal proceedings and no 
indication that the website contained unlawful content was ruled to be in 
violation of Article 10 ECHR by the ECtHR in Yıldırım v. Turkey.274 The 
Strasbourg court underlined that any preventive measures that restricts the 
right to freedom for expression, although not in principle irreconcilable 
with Article 10, are “inconceivable without a framework establishing 
precise and specific rules regarding the application of preventive 
restrictions on freedom of expression.”275 While in Yıldırım v. Turkey, a 
Turkish court had ordered to block all access to Google Sites in order to 
prevent access to a specific site, the same reasoning should apply to an 
overblocking of lawful content on an online content-sharing platform, 
moreover as a preventive measure. The ECtHR further stressed the 
importance of balancing the restrictive measure and considered it a 
necessity, which must also be reflected in the legal basis that permits the 
restriction of the right to freedom of expression.276 
A requirement for national courts to consider the effects of a blocking 
order is not contained in Article 17, because the decision to block or filter 
is made by OCSSPS based on their cooperation with rightholders. 
Moreover, Article 17 refers to proportionality only in relation to the extent 
of the ‘best efforts’ standard in Article 17(5). A framework with clear and 
precise rules that governs preventive restrictions of the right to freedom 
of expression, or the right to artistic freedom for that purpose is missing 
in Article 17. 
As a result, the formulation of Article 17(7) suggests that monitoring 
and filtering as measures to ensure the unavailability of works or other 
subject matter is not permitted because this would prevent the availability 
of non-infringing content and thereby constitute and unjustified 
restriction to Articles 11 and 13 EUCFR.277 Assigning priority to the 
 
infringing either because the uploader has obtained authorization, or because they fall 
within the scope of one of the exceptions provided for by one of the various copyright 
directives, most notably Article 5 (2) and (3) InfoSoc Directive. 
274 ECtHR (Chamber), 18 December 2012, case of Yildirim v. Turkey, Appl. no. 3111/10, 
see in particular para. 62. 
275 ECtHR (Chamber), 18 December 2012, case of Yildirim v. Turkey, Appl. no. 3111/10, 
para. 64. 
276 ECtHR (Chamber), 18 December 2012, case of Yildirim v. Turkey, Appl. no. 3111/10, 
para. 66. 
277 See e.g. an argument to that effect Reda et al. (2020), p. 8; Romero Moreno, IRLCT 
(2020); Also in that sense: Spindler, GRUR (2020), p. 259. See for empirical support a 
study by the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) which concludes that automated 
filtering mechanism (in this case Google’s ContentID software, harms creators and 
culture as a whole: Katherine Trendacosta, Unfiltered: How YouTube’s Content ID 
Discourages Fair Use and Dictates What We See Online, EFF (10 December 2020) 
available at: https://www.eff.org/wp/unfiltered-how-youtubes-content-id-discourages-
fair-use-and-dictates-what-we-see-online, last accessed 25.01.2021. 
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interest of users to exercise lawful uses underlines a hierarchy between 
Article 17(4) and 17(7) which does not become immediately apparent 
from the overall structure of Article 17. Nevertheless, contrary to what 
the governments of France and Spain have argued in the hearing on the 
annulment action in Case C-401/19, the wording of Article 17(7) read in 
the light of FR mandates that uploads are not initially filtered and 
reinstated after the user appeals through a complaint mechanism.278 
Instead, the default position is that uploads should initially be available 
and rightholders can then flag them to the OCSSP which, in the absence 
of any further indication in the text of the CDSM Directive, has to assess 
the veracity of the claim. This is also the position taken by the European 
Commission and the European Parliament during the hearing on the 
Polish challenge to Article 17.279 The procedural safeguards should not 
work to the detriment of the user but still enable rightholders to indicate 
infringing content. Against takedowns, subsequent to reasoned and 
reasonable complaints, users would then still have the opportunity to 
complain and demand redress, possibly, as is argued below, through ADR 
mechanisms offered by an independent institution.280 Article 17(9) 
requires that out-of-court mechanisms are made available to users to “not 
deprive the user of the legal protection afforded by national law”. The 




278 Keller, Article 17: (Mis)understanding the intent of the legislator, available at: 
http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2021/01/28/article-17-misunderstanding-the-
intent-of-the-legislator/, accessed: 28.01.2021, criticizing a report on “Content 
Recognition tools on Digital Sharing Platforms: Proposals for the Implementation of 
Article 17 of the EU Copyright Directive” published on 19.01.2021 and commissioned 




contenus-et-des-oeuvres-sur-les-plateformes-de-partage-en-ligne-II). According to the 
report, the availability of infringing content can cause significant economic harm for 
rightholders, which justifies the “rare, limited and proportional infringement of freedom 
of expression” resulting from the application of automated filtering. Keller however 
notes that this reading of Art. 17, which validates automated filtering and gives 
preference to ex post redress mechanisms to safeguard user’s rights, is not backed by the 
legislative history of the provision, as “the true intent of the EU legislator has been to 
add strong independent user rights safeguards in an effort to get Article 17 past the finish 
line”. 
279 Keller, CJEU hearing in the Polish challenge to Article 17: Not even the supporters 
of the provision agree on how it should work, available at: 
http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2020/11/11/cjeu-hearing-in-the-polish-
challenge-to-article-17-not-even-the-supporters-of-the-provision-agree-on-how-it-
should-work/, accessed: 25.01.2021. 
280 See infra 3.6, see for example the Finnish proposal for implementing Article 17 as 
described by Keller, Finnish Article 17 implementation proposal prohibits the use of 
automated upload filters, available at: 
http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2020/12/23/finnish-article-17-implementation-
proposal-prohibits-the-use-of-automated-upload-filters/, accessed: 25.01.2021. 
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b. The imperatives of exceptions and limitations 
Article 17(7) CDSM provides that users of online content-sharing 
services shall be able to rely on the exceptions or limitations for (a) 
quotation, criticism, review and the (b) the use for the purpose of 
caricature, parody or pastiche when uploading or making available 
content generated by users. First and foremost, this formulation (‘shall’) 
makes these exceptions mandatory, as opposed to their equivalents in the 
InfoSoc Directive.281 Furthermore, singling out these exceptions from all 
the others included in Article 5(2) and (3) InfoSoc Directive suggests that 
these two specific sets of exceptions are more important, or distinguish 
themselves in some other way from all other exceptions. It is safe to say, 
in any case, that the exceptions or limitations that must be available to 
users of online content-sharing services are highly reflective of the right 
to freedom of expression and artistic freedom.282 Their appearance in 
Article 17 is another indication of the importance of FR, in particular the 
informational FR of users.283 
This freedom would be restricted if uses falling within the scope of 
one of the exceptions listed, and certainly also other exceptions that are 
available under the respective national laws, would be prevented by 
general or specific filtering. The specific importance of certain types of 
expression, particularly speech of a political nature,284 would weigh 
heavily against the application of content filters by OCSSPs that would 
inevitably create collateral effects on lawful speech.285 For this purpose, 
procedural safeguards are essential. 
The operation of such procedural safeguards by platforms raises 
further problems which are rooted in the lack of full harmonization of 
copyright exceptions in the EU. Not only does the assessment of whether 
a particular assessment is infringing require a delicate legal analysis when 
a use potentially falls within the scope of a copyright exceptions. But 
 
281 See Articles 5(3)(d) & (k) InfoSoc Directive. 
282 See for example Jütte, Finding the Balance in Copyright Law: Internal and External 
Control Through Fundamental Rights in: Torremans (2020), p. 473, see also Szpunar, C-
476/17 Pelham and Others, para. 77. 
283 Underlining this is recital 70 CDSM Directive, which states that “[t]he steps taken by 
online content-sharing service providers in cooperation with rightholders should be 
without prejudice to the application of exceptions or limitations to copyright, including, 
in particular, those which guarantee the freedom of expression of users.” See further 
Quintais et al., JIPITEC (2019), pp. 278-279, the authors argue that the scope of the 
exceptions and limitations for quotation, criticism, review and the use for the purpose of 
caricature, parody or pastiche mentioned in Article 17(7) is the same as in Article 5(3) 
InfoSoc Directive. 
284 Cf. ECtHR (5th section), 10 January 2013, case of Ashby Donald and other v. France, 
Appl. no. 36769/08, para. 32. 
285 As a result, the mandatory nature of the exceptions or limitation listed in Article 17(7) 
should significantly limit OCSSPs’ obligations to implement automated filters. Because 
the current technological state of the art does not permit distinguishing between lawful 
and unlawful uploads, the application of filters must ensure that these exceptions must 
be exercisable by users of online content-sharing platforms, and that such uses cannot 
be blocked or filtered. It is also necessary, in order to ensure the effective exercise of 
exceptions and other lawful uses, and to avoid chilling effects, that suspected unlawful 
content that does not pass the ‘manifestly illegal’ threshold remains online. 
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these relevant exceptions might be implemented in one Member Sate 
while they remain unimplemented in another. Article 17(7) merely 
requires that certain exception must be available for users of online 
platforms, but it does not mean that in different Member States users 
cannot also rely on others. Diverging national lists of copyright 
exceptions therefore add another layer of complexity to the obligations of 
OCSSPs under Article 17. 
 
c. Procedural safeguards 
The removal of works or in cases in which access has been disabled, 
users of online content-sharing platforms must have access to effective 
and expeditious complaint and redress mechanisms.286 AG Szpunar in 
Glawischnig-Piesczek underlined that users must be able to challenge 
implementing measures of intermediaries before a court as a safeguard 
for the exercise of freedom of expression.287 The specific design of the 
mechanisms is not described by Article 17(9) CDSM, thus adding to the 
uncertainty with regard to a sufficient protection of the rights of users, but 
the standards that apply in order to enable users to challenge unjustified 
takedowns and staydowns of their uploaded content are laid down here. 
First and foremost, complaint mechanisms must be effective and 
expeditious. This requires that OCSSPs make resources available to 
process user requests relatively fast. Depending on the nature of the 
content, the urgency of a complaint will differ, while slightly longer 
processing periods could be considered proportionate for content with an 
entertainment purpose, which can nevertheless be protected by Article 13 
EUCFR. Content that serves to participate in a current political debate, or 
which comments on current events, will require a more expedited 
procedure.288 These differentiations will have to be embedded in 
complaint mechanisms in order to safeguard the exercise of FR. 
The design of complaint and redress mechanisms can also not be 
decoupled from considerations on the design of Article 17(4) obligations. 
The amount of and the way how content is filtered will determine the 
volume of complaints platforms will have to handle and how much 
resources they have to expend on establishing complaint and redress 
mechanisms.289 This correlation has direct implications on OCSSPs 
freedom to conduct a business under Article 16 EUCFR, especially 
because decisions to remove content pursuant to Article 17(4)(b) must be 
subject to human review. 
Whereas these obligations to ensure proper (human) review of likely 
 
286 Article 17(9) CDSM Directive. 
287 AG Szpunar, C-18/18 Glawischnig-Piesczek, para. 65, cf. Kuczerawy, & Rauchegger, 
C.M.L. Rev. (2020), p. 1516. 
288 See to that effect Senftleben, SSRN (2019), p. 9. 
289 Essentially, the more content OCSSPS will have to filter and block, or otherwise 




automated takedowns and staydowns and removal requests serve to 
ensure the rights of users, the burden imposed on OCSSPS is not 
insignificant. Moreover, the proportionality considerations under Article 
17(5) relate expressly only to obligations arising under Article 17(4). 
Placing this obligation on OCSSPS would neither respect the right to an 
effective remedy and a fair trial, nor the freedom to conduct a business of 
OCSSPs. Instead, this mandated element of human review must be 
located elsewhere, preferable in the out-of-court mechanisms expressly 
referred to in Article 17(9). 
 
 Resolving fundamental rights conflicts through an institutional 
mediator 
Our analysis of the FR implications of Article 17 CDSM Directive has 
demonstrated that within the express wording, and certainly within a 
narrow reading of Article 17, a fair balance of interests is extremely 
difficult if not impossible to achieve.290 More critically, the restrictive and 
limiting effects Article 17 will inevitably have on the rights of users and 
platform operators are not sufficiently defined in the text of the provision. 
Instead, the burden of the task to protect the rights of rightholders must 
be borne by OCSSPs, which also have to make critical decisions which 
will, in many cases, restrict the right to freedom of expression and the 
right to artistic freedom. This burden has, as we have amply 
demonstrated, significant restrictive effects on the freedom to conduct a 
business of platform operators, not least by failing to provide legal 
certainty as to the specific scope of the obligations OCSSPs incur under 
Article 17. Moreover, the lack of legal certainty created by insufficient 
harmonization of important aspects of copyright law in the EU (e.g. 
limitations and exceptions and moral rights), combined with the 
foreseeable differing transpositions of Article 17 in the EU Member 
States, creates further difficulties for OCSSPs with potentially 
detrimental effects of the rights of users and rightholders, and certainly 
for platform operators. 
One of the most critical defects of Article 17 is that normative 
decisions on the balance between the various FR are outsourced to private 
platform operators, who, in addition, will have to provide a quasi-judicial 
appeals infrastructure to mediate between rightholders and users. Putting 
this responsibility in the hands of private economic actors not only 
burdens them with costly procedures but also fundamentally undermines 
the effective protection of FR if these actors have their own economic 
interests which will most likely influence their decision making. 
A possible solution to this triangular dilemma would be to introduce 
an institutional intermediary.291 The legislative seed from which such a 
 
290 See in general on the difficulty on providing legislative guidance for the operation of 
upload filters: Sartor, & Loreggia (2020), p. 64. 
291 As suggested in similar form by Frosio & Geiger, SSRN (2020), pp. 42-44, proposing 
the creation of a “Digital Single Market and Ethics EU Observatory” to monitor and 
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regulatory institution can be developed lies buried in Article 17(9). In the 
adopted version of Article 17, “out-of-court” redress mechanisms are 
foreseen for users,292 which should also have access to a court “or another 
relevant judicial authority to assert the use of an exception or 
limitation”.293 We argue, however, that an institution that deals, certainly 
in last instance, with user complaints could also serve to pre-emptively 
safeguard the rights of users and rightholders and develop guidelines and 
best practices to enable OCSSPS to comply with their obligations.294 An 
independent institution that sits firmly at the intersection of the various 
interests could more realistically contribute, through several mechanisms, 
to maintaining a fair and proper balance between the FR at stake.295 
First, such an ‘intermediary institution’ could determine the standards 
that apply to targeted filtering obligation. Targeted filtering is 
undoubtedly necessary to create a proper balance within Article 17 and is 
not excluded by Article 17(8). Therefore, the task to define what uploads 
constitute ‘manifestly infringing’ material which can then be subject to 
advance filtering should be delegated to a neutral independent third party, 
ideally an EU oversight institution that would inter alia have the task to 
guarantee a FR compliant implementation of Art. 17 at least in this 
respect. Substantively, it is certainly not sufficient to rely on standards 
 
regulate inter alia the new platform liability regimes implemented by the CDSM 
Directive and the new proposed Digital Services Act; see also Garstka, Guiding the Blind 
Bloodhonds: How to Mitigate the Risks Article 17 of Directive 2019/970 Poses to the 
Freedom of Expression in: Torremans (2020), pp. 350-351, proposing to introduce a 
dedicated EU- wide neutral, administrative body which could help in ensuring the 
adequate implementation and functioning of the enforcement schemes introduced by art. 
17 CDSM; Kulk, Internet Intermediaries and Copyright Law, Towards a Future-proof 
EU Legal Framework (2018), p. 302 sq, proposing to move from private ordering to co-
regulation though the active involvement of a governmental body to ensure transparency 
and “that the rights and interests of users are sufficiently considered and protected”. As 
Kulk convincingly argues, “co-regulation can help to protect basic principles, such as the 
protection of FR, the need for transparency, and a fair consideration of the rights and 
interests of all affected parties. Specifically regarding copyright law, co-regulation 
enables governments to prevent that stronger stakeholders- intermediaries and copyright 
owners- make agreement to undermine the copyright balance” (at 303). See more 
generally Perel, & Elkin-Koren, Stan. Tech L. Rev (2016), p. 531, who advocate 
increasing the competence of regulators to supervise and secure transparency of 
copyright enforcing algorithms. 
292 See recital 70 CDSM Directive, which specifically states that “Member States should 
also ensure that users have access to out-of-court redress mechanisms for the settlement 
of disputes. Such mechanisms should allow disputes to be settled impartially.” 
293 Article 17(9) CDSM Directive; the authors of another study suggest external 
alternative dispute resolution bodies to ensure the fundamental rights of users, see 
Alexandre de Streel, & Martin Husovec, The e-commerce Directive as the cornerstone 
of the Internal Market. Assessment and options for reform. Study requested by the IMCO 
Committee (2020), p. 48. 
294 See also Sartor & Loreggia (2020), p. 65, the authors suggest more generally 
applicable to platforms that the Commission draws up guidelines which can then be 
implemented by existing national regulatory media or communication authorities. 
However, the authors also ponder the possibility of establishing of a new European 
authority to regulate online platforms. 




such as identity or significant quantitative congruencies. The standard of 
what constitutes ‘manifestly infringing’,296 should be developed and 
constantly reviewed by this institution that is vested with judicial or quasi-
judicial powers.  
Thereby, OCSSPs would be relieved from the responsibility to decide 
in borderline cases between lawful and unlawful uses, giving such 
decisions more legitimacy; and the rights of users would be better 
safeguarded by avoiding most overblocking of lawful content.  
Second, notice and takedown and staydown decisions could be 
administered by such an independent institution, with the same benefits 
as outlined in the preceding paragraphs. In addition, interposing an 
independent institution in the cooperation between users and rightholders 
ensured observance with the right to a fair trial and an effective remedy. 
ADR mechanisms to mediate conflicts between rightholders, platform 
and users and develop best practices and guidelines for filtering practice 
that would respect EU primary law will also need to be implemented and 
could be appointed to this institution.297 
Third, an independent institution could be charged to draw up and 
develop more concrete and binding guidelines that OCSSPs and 
rightholders could rely on when fulfilling their obligations under Article 
17(4). Users would equally benefit from more guidance on the distinction 
between lawful and unlawful uses. The experience that could be gathered 
by an independent copyright body would be invaluable not only for 
mediating between OCSSPs, users and rightholder. 298 This experience 
could also help to identify and justify further need for harmonization of 
substantive copyright law and monitor the necessity to adapt the 
legislative framework to adapt it to new technological, economic and 
societal circumstances. 
However, until such an independent system or further guarantees to 
secure FR-compliant filtering measures are put in place at EU level, Art. 
17(4) seems very hard to reconcile with the FR guaranteed by both the 
EU Charter and the ECHR. 
 
296 As an example of a targeted, restrictive standard that would be deemed appropriate in 
the light of FR. It should however be noted that such a standard is not the panacea. The 
appreciation of what is ‘manifestly illegal’ is still context-specific, and what is 
“manifestly illegal” in a certain situation can still be non-infringing in another context. 
This clearly shows the need to monitor closely by an independent third party the 
definition and the practicability of this criteria. 
297 For such a proposal see Frosio & Geiger, SSRN (2020), p. 42 sq.; the institution could 
also be tasked with providing for redress and appeals mechanisms required under Article 
17(9). 
298 Already proposing an independent regulation authority or an EU Copyright council, 
tasked among other to secure freedom of expression in the context of disputes around 
creative re-uses and copyright limitations, see Geiger, UCI L. Rev. (2018), p. 457. More 
generally, the idea of Copyright Council in the EU has been developed by Franciska 
Schönherr in her Ph.D. thesis under the direction of Christophe Geiger defended at the 
University of Strasbourg on 3 October 2017. See Franciska Schönherr, ‘The 
Construction of an EU Copyright Law, Towards a Balanced Institutional and Legal 






The problem with Article 17 is its incompatibility with the Treaties of 
the EU and the fundamental basic principles of EU law. First, the 
contradictions and vague concepts which we have exposed above turn the 
transposition of Article 17 into an extremely complicated exercise for 
national legislators. It is at the national level where important normative 
decisions will have to be made, which impact on the fundamental rights 
of users, rightholders and platform operators. However, after the Schrems 
II ruling it is clear that such normative determinations under EU law must 
be made by the EU legislator and cannot be left to national parliaments. 
Second, the difficult task left to national legislators under the current 
formulation of Article 17will very likely not lead to a level of 
harmonization that would have justified the exercise of Article 114 TFEU 
as legal basis for internal market harmonization.299 Draft implementation 
bills of the Directive in several Member States are already showing that 
Article 17 will be implemented in various diverging ways, which will 
augment the confusion already created by a provision with unclear 
wording and conflicting aims to the detriment of the creation of a true 
Digital Single Market.300 
Article 17 creates a complicated construct of rights and obligations 
 
299 For a similar criticism in relation to the InfoSoc Directive see P. Bernt Hugenholtz, 
Why the Copyright Directive is unimportant, and possibly invalid, 22(11) European 
Intellectual Property Review (2000), 499-505: “Since the Directive has little or nothing 
to offer in terms of legal certainty or harmonisation (or anything else, for that matter), 
one must question the solidity of its legal basis in the EC Treaty” (…) In sum, the 
Directive lacks a proper legal basis, and should be annulled”; Ana Ramalho, The 
Competence of the European Union in Copyright Lawmaking, (Baden-Baden: Springer, 
2016), p. 126, the use of Art. 114 TFEU as a competence for the EU should lead to "an 
assessment of whether the provisions of the directive at stake can actually achieve de 
facto harmonization"; the author further underlines that a broad wording in a 
harmonizing measure “might not lead to an effective harmonization of national laws, 
since Member States might interpret it in different ways.“ (p. 130), see also Ana 
Ramalho, The competence and rationale of EU copyright harmonization, in: Eleonora 
Rosati (ed.), Routledge Handbook of EU Copyright Law, (Abingdon, New York: 
Routledge, 2021 forthcoming). Looking at the competence issue in respect to Art. 17 and 
its challenge is important since according to CJEU case law, the grounds of lack of 
competence of the EU must be raised by Court ex officio (i.e. even if the parties failed 
to raise them), see Koen Lenaerts, Ignace Maselis, Kathleen Gutman, EU Procedural 
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 365. 
300 See Paul Keller, Divergence instead of guidance: the Article 17 implementation 
discussion in 2020 – Part 1, available at: 
http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2021/01/21/divergence-instead-of-guidance-the-
article-17-implementation-discussion-in-2020-part-1/, accessed: 25.01.2021. See also 
Agnès Lucas-Schloetter, L’article 17 de la directive 2019/790 sur la responsabilité des 
plateformes de partage de contenu culturels: clarification des règles préexistantes ou 
nouveau régime sui generis ?, Propriétés Intellectuelles 2021, n° 78, p. 6 : “Sa version 
finale, longue de dix alinéas et dont le moins qu’on puisse dire est qu’elle ne brille pas 
par sa clarté, est le fruit des âpres négociations et marchandages de dernière minute qui 
ont été nécessaires pour que le texte puisse être adopté”. 
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that seems to be based on the assumption that a balance within this 
construct can be maintained and adjusted by technological means. “The 
answer to the machine is in the machine”, to quote a famous article of the 
1990s301, at a time where all hopes were put by rightholders and 
subsequently policy makers in technology- namely technical protection 
measures- to solve the difficulties to enforce copyright in the digital 
environment.302 Despite huge efforts in the EU and worldwide, we know 
that technical protection has not solved the issue of mass infringements 
of copyright law. Twenty years later, it seems that the same mistakes are 
made. 
Filtering technology has not reached the level of sophistication that 
would avoid most collateral effects. As a result, the balance between the 
FR must be struck by private parties through a system of cooperation 
between rightholders and OCSSPs and quasi-adjudication of user 
complaints. In the formulation of Article 17, an external arbiter which 
would ensure compliance with FR is missing. “The answer to the machine 
should not be in the machine”, or in short: what the is acceptable online 
or what is not needs to be decided collectively and not by a few, and via 
independent mechanisms that duly safeguards FR.303 
Furthermore, Article 17 fails to provide specific guidance on the 
priority of outcomes. Whether the requirement to make works and other 
subject matter unavailable to protect the rights of rightholders is absolute, 
or whether the rights of users to perform lawful acts have to be given 
priority when OCSSPs design their mechanism to comply with their own 
obligations, is not apparent from the legal text. This is arguably so because 
a strict determination based on general standards how a proper balance 
must be struck is difficult. The reference to proportionality as an arbiter 
between the competing FR is also unhelpful because the obligations and 
guarantees established in Article 17 are extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, to reconcile. 
Without external intervention decisions whether to prioritise the rights 
of rightholders or the rights of users would fall to OCSSPs, who would 
have to invest significant resources to make this decision on countless of 
occasions. This is further problematic for two reasons. First, the immense 
efforts required would restrict their freedom to conduct a business, 
especially if OCSSPs would have to act as a quasi-judicial actor. Second, 
and more importantly, OCSSPs lack the legitimacy to make such 
decision, which should be reserved to an independent body that considers 
the interests of all involved parties form a more neutral normative 
 
301 Charles Clark, The Answer to the Machine is in the Machine, in: P. Bernt Hugenholtz 
(ed.), The Future of Copyright in a Digital Environment, (Aalphen an den Rijn: Kluwer 
Law International, 1996), p. 139. 
302 See the WIPO Copyright Treaties of 1996 and the InfoSoc Directive of 2001, Article. 
6. 
303 Christophe Geiger, The answer to the machine should not be the machine: 
safeguarding the private copy exception in the digital environment, 30(4) European 
Intellectual Property Review (2008), 121-129, arguing that the answer to the machine 
should not be in the machine and one could think of replacing Clark’s sentence by the 
following one: ‘‘The answer to Copyrights’ problems is to be found within Copyright’’. 
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perspective and can apply all necessary procedural safeguards. 
By failing to properly address the FR tension in online enforcement 
on content-sharing platforms, Article 17 does not provide for a legal 
framework that creates a proper balance between the various interest and 
FR. In its current form, it is difficult not to consider it in violation of 
Article 11 EUCFR, but also other FR, including the right to property and 
the freedom to conduct a business. 
It is clear that the implementation of the various obligations arising 
under Article 17 requires careful consideration. The general wording of 
Article 17(4) leaves much room for flexibility which can be exercised 
either by strict and detailed legislative prescription, or by imposing 
outcome-based due diligence obligations for OCSSPs. The question 
whether Article 17(4) requires OCSSPs to filter, however, does not arise. 
Under the technological framework described in this article, the 
fulfilment of the obligation to ensure the unavailability of content or 
prevent the upload of works which have been notified can only be 
achieved by installing filters that identify infringing content before it 
becomes available (again). 
Therefore, the use of filtering technology should be carefully 
monitored not by OCSSPs themselves, but by an external institution, 
which serves as a supervisory authority on the subject matter which 
platforms can filter. The introduction of an independent institution would 
serve to recognize that the platform landscape has “drastically 
changed”304 since the adoption of the ECD and that other mechanisms are 
required to ensure the rights of all interested parties. 
An independent institution would not leave the adaptation to these 
new circumstances solely in the hands of private parties who would 
negotiate above the heads of users what content to filter, but it would take 
the responsibility to make important decisions on the balancing of rights 
and FR. Such a ‘judicial intermediary’ should further be tasked to develop 
guidelines and good practices that OCSSPs can rely on and when 
determining whether they comply with the “best efforts” requirement 
under Article 17(4). We thus believe that only the creation of an 
independent entity, combined with a more concrete pronunciation of the 
balance of rights and obligation under Article 17 in the future would 
guarantee a FR-compliant implementation of Article 17 and construct a 
socially accepted and acceptable system of liability for content uploaded 
by users. In the absence of such an institution, it is hard to imagine how 
the provision could be “saved” from a complete annulment by the CJEU.  
The annulment of this unworkable provision would then give the 
European legislator a great opportunity to elaborate a balanced liability 
regime for platforms and to implement it in a manner compliant with 
fundamental rights. This could be done without difficulty in the context 
of the ongoing discussion of the proposed Digital Service Act305, which 
 
304 P9_TA(2020)0274, point B. 
305 Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Single 
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main purpose is in fact to regulate the activities and responsibilities of 
platforms306 and which faces similar challenges with regard to the 
protection of fundamental rights.307 The proposed regulation would then 
be able to create a unified, horizontal and clearer approach to deal with 
illegal content online, coupled with an appropriate independent EU 
institutional monitoring and control mechanism. Indeed, an exciting 
perspective for the creation of a performing, competitive but at the same 





Market for Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and amending Directive 2000/31/EC, 
15.12.2020, COM (2020) 825 final. 
306 See in this sense the Explanatory Memorandum of the Proposed regulation, p. 2: “The 
proposal defines clear responsibilities and accountability for providers of intermediary 
services, and in particular online platforms, such as social media and marketplace (….). 
Building on the key principles set out in the e-Commerce Directive, which remain valid 
today, this proposal seeks to ensure the best conditions for the provision of innovative 
digital services in the internal market, to contribute to online safety and the protection 
of fundamental rights, and to set a robust and durable governance structure for the 
effective supervision of providers of intermediary services.  
307 See more detailed Frosio & Geiger, SSRN (2020). 
